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HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
SEP 1 5 2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 





STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ELMORE, ) 
Case No. CV09-8175 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT 
WARD IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERING 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT WARD fN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 




ROBERT WARD, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am the attorney for Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, in the above-
captioned matters, and, as such, have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the Court of 
Appeals 2008 Opinion No. 60, as referenced in Answering Brief in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs 
Answers and Responses to Defendant Bernardino Barraza's Requests for Admissions, First 
Set of Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents. Specifically, 
Interrogatory No. 6 requested any payments Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims to have 
made for the purchase price of the property. Interrogatory No. 8 requested the details of 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', alleged agreement to purchase the property. Said responses 
0 contained in Plaintiffs Responses to Interrogatory No. 6 and No. 8, are referenced in 
Defendant's Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the d day of September, 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of Affidavit of Robert Ward in Support of Defendant's 
Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment of by 
the method indicated below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX 829 
BOISE, ID 83701 





AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT WARD fN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 




IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 34421 
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YRENE ) 












LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual, and ) 
DOES I through X, unknown claimants to the) 
real property described in Exhibit "A", ) 
commonly known as 29452 Pear Road, ) 
Parma, Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
2008 Opinion No. 60 
Filed: June 24, 2008 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Canyon County. Hon. Dennis E. Goff, District Judge. 
Order denying motion to set aside default judgment, reversed and case remanded. 
Robert W. Ward of Hall, Friedly & Ward, Mountain Home, for appellant. 
Mark D. Perison, Boise, for respondents. 
PERRY, Judge 
Bernardino Barraza appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to set aside 
a default judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order, vacate the default 
judgment, and remand to the district court. 
EXHIBIT 
000353 I I 
\" ' 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
In March 2001, Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez (hereinafter referred to as 
"Cuevas") allegedly entered into an agreement with Bernardino Barraza and Liobaldo Garza 
regarding real property (hereinafter "the ranch") owned by Cuevas. On May 6, 2002, Barraza 
recorded a form legal document titled "Claim of Lien," which was signed by Garza and himself 
on April 1, 2002. As filled in, the lien asserted that Cuevas contracted Barraza and Garza to 
furnish "labor, service or materials consisting of unpaid refund in the amount $20,000.00 for the 
payments on real estate title on" the ranch. (Filled-in portions of form in italics). The lien also 
asserted that the $20,000 remained unpaid and the "lienor furnished the first of the items on the 
fifth day of January, 2002," and the "last of the items on the fifth day of January, 2002." The 
lien also stated that "lienor" had provided the ''contractor'' with notice of the lien on March 7, 
2002. 
On April 2, 2007, Cuevas filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the ranch and seeking 
damages for slander of title. Barraza received service of the complaint on April 15, 2007. 1 
Barraza having filed no answer, Cuevas filed a motion for default judgment and supporting 
Q affidavits on May 9, 2007. On May 15, 2007, the district court entered an order of default 
judgment. 
( 
On May 24, 2007, Barraza filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 60(b), with an affidavit of counsel for Barraza and a proposed answer to the complaint 
and counterclaim. 2 The answer and counterclaim alleged that Cuevas executed a written 
contract to sell the ranch to Barraza on March 6, 2001, for $80,000, and Barraza paid 
$22,635.76, as a down payment. Barraza attached as an exhibit the purported contract, which 
consists of two pages, one of which is written in Spanish. Barraza further alleged that Cuevas 
later orally promised to reimburse Barraza $20,000 upon re-sale of the ranch to another party if 
Although counsel also averred in the affidavit that he filed the original affidavits of 
service on Garza and Barraza with the motion for default judgment, those documents are not 
included in the record before us. 
2 The record indicates that counsel for Barraza also represented Garza in this matter prior 
to when Cuevas filed the complaint. Garza was not a party to Barraza's answer, however, and is 
not a party to this appeal. 
2 
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Barraza would vacate the premises. Barraza pled that he vacated the property and Cuevas had 
not reimbursed the $20,000. Barraza's answer also alleged affirmative defenses that Barraza was 
the owner of the ranch, Cuevas should be equitably estopped from denying he sold the ranch to 
Barraza, and the statute of limitation barred Cuevas' claims. The answer also included 
counterclaims of breach of a written contract, breach of an oral contract, breach of an implied in-
fact contract, unjust enrichment, equitable estoppel, and a claim to quiet title to the ranch in 
Barraza. In the affidavit, Barraza's counsel averred that Barraza had previously retained him as 
counsel with regard to the dispute over this land several months before the complaint was filed 
but did not contact him promptly when served with the complaint. According to counsel's 
affidavit, Barraza believed that he did not need to contact counsel due to counsel's prior 
representation. Counsel further averred that Barraza spoke very little English and thus could not 
understand the summons requiring a responsive pleading in twenty days. 
Cuevas filed a brief in opposition to the motion with a supporting affidavit and evidence 
of correspondence between his counsel and counsel for Barraza. The first letter, faxed from 
counsel for Cuevas to counsel for Barraza on March 19, 2007, requested that Barraza and Garza 
release the lien and indicated that, if they failed to do so, Cuevas would file a complaint to quiet 
Q title after March 23, 2007. The letter also included a copy of the complaint to be filed and 
indicated that, if counsel was still representing Barraza and Garza, he should contact them to 
make them aware of the impending litigation. In the second letter, faxed from counsel for 
Cuevas to counsel for Barraza on May 21, 2007, counsel indicated that he had received a phone 
message from Barraza's counsel stating that Barraza had "surfaced" and wished to defend 
against the action. Cuevas asserted in the brief that Barraza had not established excusable 
neglect with the affidavit of his counsel and that Barraza did not have a meritorious defense 
against the quiet title action. 
( 
At a hearing, the district court ruled that Barraza had not established a mistake or 
excusable neglect because Rule 60(b) does not mention a language barrier or lack of knowledge 
of the legal system as bases to set aside a default judgment. The district court stated that a 
reasonable person who received a summons in a foreign language "would have contacted a 
lawyer if they were familiar with the lawyer to advise them." The district court also ruled that 




because Barraza had not set forth facts that Barraza had a valid lien on the ranch. Regarding the 
effect of the lien, the district court stated: 
Even if I said there was a land sale agreement for this particular piece of 
property, which I would have to assume that's what the Spanish document says . 
and that's referring to this piece of property, the lien says we're not claiming any 
ownership of that property any longer. All we're claiming is that when he sold it 
he was going to give us $20,000. 
The district court reasoned that, although Barraza may have alleged facts that would establish a 
meritorious claim for $20,000 in monetary damages, the default judgment only affected the 
validity of the lien and did not preclude any future action for monetary damages. Because the 
statute of limitation had run with regard to any claims based on the lien, the district court 
concluded that Barraza did not have a meritorious defense against the quiet title action. The 
district court subsequently entered an order denying Barraza's motion to set aside the default 
judgment. Barraza appeals. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A default judgment may be set aside where it resulted from, inter alia, excusable neglect 
or mistake of fact. I.R.C.P. 60(b). A trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Idaho State Police, ex. rel. Russell v. Real 
Property Situated in County of Cassia, 144 Idaho 60, 62, 156 P.3d 561, 563 (2007). On review 
of the trial court's application of law to the facts found on a motion to set aside a default 
judgment upon the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b)(l), the reviewing court will consider whether 
appropriate criteria were applied and whether the result is one that logically follows. Tyler v. 
Keeney, 128 Idaho 524, 526, 915 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, if: (a) the trial court 
makes findings of fact which are not clearly erroneous; (b) the court applies to those facts the 
proper criteria under Rule 60(b)(l) (tempered by the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases); 
and (c) the trial court's decision follows logically from the application of such criteria to the facts 
found, then the trial court will be deemed to have acted within its sound discretion, and its 





A. Mistake of Fact or Excusable Neglect 
Barraza asserts that the district court erred in ruling that he had not established that his 
failure to timely file an answer to the complaint was due to a mistake or excusable neglect. 
Cuevas asserts that Barraza did not present any admissible evidence establishing excusable 
neglect because Barraza relied entirely on the inadmissible hearsay statements contained in his 
counsel's affidavit. Cuevas also asserts that the inability to speak or read English is not a 
sufficient basis to establish mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(l). 
We first address Cuevas' assertion that Barraza presented no admissible evidence 
supporting his assertion of mistake or excusable neglect. Barraza presented only the 
inadmissible hearsay statements contained in an affidavit by Barraza's counsel as to Barraza's 
mistake. See I.R.E. 801, 802. Cuevas, however, did not object to the admissibility of the 
affidavit at the hearing on the motion to set aside default. When ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, a trial court may consider an affidavit containing statements that fail to comply with 
the admissibility requirements of I.R.C.P. 56( e) in the absence of a timely objection and motion 
(!) to strike.3 See State, Dept. of Agric. v. Curry Bean Co. Inc., 139 Idaho 789, 792, 86 P.3d 503, 
506 (2004); Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 607,610, 862 P.2d 299,302 
(1993); Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878,881,693 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Ct. App. 1984). The same 
rule should apply to the failure to properly object to the admissibility of statements contained in 
an affidavit submitted to establish excusable neglect to set aside a default judgment. Although 
Cuevas asserted in the brief in opposition to the motion to set aside default that the affidavit was 
hearsay, he did not move to strike nor object to its consideration by the district court. Rather 
than object, counsel for Cuevas provided little argument in opposition to Barraza's theory of 
mistake or excusable neglect. Indeed, counsel stated "I think if the meritorious defense issue 
weren't here in front of us, I wouldn't be here. I would have stipulated to set aside the default 
because I understand how liberal that standard is in terms of mistake." 
( 
3 Pursuant to Rule 56( e ), supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 




The district court expressly rejected Barraza's assertion that a language barrier could 
cause mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b )(1) and, thus, considered the affidavit as 
evidence. Because the district court considered the affidavit as evidence at the hearing, we will 
also consider it in the absence of an adequate objection below. 
Barraza asserts that the affidavit provided a sufficient factual basis for a mistake or 
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(l). The affidavit provided, in part: 
4. Defendant believed that I was representing him after our 
discussions regarding the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did 
not need to let me know that a lawsuit had been filed and a lady had given him 
papers as service of process. 
5. Defendant speaks very little English, cannot read or write English, 
and thus did not understand the notice in the Summons requiring him to file a 
responsive pleading within twenty (20) days. 
The record indicates that Barraza received service of the summons and complaint on April 15, 
2007. Rule 12(a) required Barraza to file his responsive pleading within twenty days--by May 5, 
2007. The district court entered default judgment on May 15, 2007, and the record indicates that 
Barraza filed his motion to set aside default, with a responsive pleading attached, on May 24, 
2007. Thus, even if we assume that Barraza received service of the default judgment on the date 
it was entered, he filed his motion to set aside the default judgment within nine days. 
Barraza asserts that the affidavit demonstrated mistake or excusable neglect due to his 
communication barrier, his poor knowledge of the legal system, his mistaken belief that counsel 
was representing him in this matter at the time he received the summons, and his diligence in 
moving to set aside the default judgment. A mistake sufficient to warrant setting aside a default 
judgment must be of fact and not oflaw. Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563. 
Neglect must be excusable and, to be of that calibre, must be conduct that might be expected of a 
reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. Id. Reasonable diligence in the effort 
to set aside the default judgment is a requirement in demonstrating reasonably prudent conduct. 
See Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525, 528, 757 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Ct. App. 1988); Clark v. 
Atwood, 112 Idaho 115,117, 730 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Ct. App. 1986). 
In several cases with lengthier delays than that caused by Barraza, Idaho appellate courts 
have held that relief should be granted from default judgment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Oxborrow, 




. . -._.., 
842 P.2d 309, 311 (Ct. App. 1992); Baldwin, 114 Idaho at 527, 757 P.2d at 1246; Johnson v. 
Pioneer Title Co. of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727, 733, 662 P.2d 1171, 1177 (Ct. App. 1983). 
These cases demonstrate that in doubtful cases a standard of liberality rather than strictness must 
be applied. See Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563. The district court erred in 
not applying the standard of liberality to this case. 
The district court also erred to the extent that it ruled a language barrier cannot be 
considered in evaluating mistake or excusable neglect. See Straub v. Straub, 80 Idaho 221, 225, 
327 P.2d 358, 360 (1958). In Straub, the Supreme Court considered a party's inability to speak 
the English language as a factor in support of its holding that the district court erred in denying a 
motion to set aside a default judgment. 4 Id. 
Furthermore, the district court does not appear to have considered Barraza's factual 
assertion that he believed that counsel was representing him in this matter at the time he received 
the summons, and diligence in moving to set aside the default judgment. Cuevas's attorney 
asserts that he mailed a copy of the complaint to counsel for Barraza prior to filing the complaint, 
but this assertion fails to establish that counsel for Barraza knew the date the complaint would be 
filed or that Barraza wished to employ counsel's services in contesting the complaint. The 
Q affidavit of counsel for Barraza indicates that Barraza had the mistaken belief that counsel was 
representing him based upon counsel's prior representation of him in this matter. Although the 
district court was correct that a mistake of law or a mistake regarding the legal system is not 
grounds for relief from default judgment, Barraza has established that he made a factual mistake 
regarding his relationship with his attorney. 
( 
The affidavit considered by the district court indicates that Barraza's delay was due to his 
misunderstanding of the English language and his mistaken belief that counsel was representing 
him. Barraza diligently moved to set aside the default judgment nine days after it was entered. 
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that Barraza was guilty of indifference or 
deliberate delay in failing to timely answer the complaint. The district court abused its discretion 
4 Straub applied the default judgment standard contained in the repealed LC. § 5-905. 
Similar to Rule 60(b )( 1 ), that former section also allowed a trial court to set aside a default 
judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. See 1921 Idaho Sess. Laws, 
ch. 235. The Idaho Supreme Court has also recently relied on its opinions interpreting the 
former LC.§ 5-905, for guidance in applying Rule 60(b)(l). See Johnson, 141 Idaho at 639, 115 





(~~ by applying the incorrect legal standards and failing to adequately consider Barraza's factual 
assertions. Applying the proper standards, the district court should have concluded that Barraza 
demonstrated mistake or excusable neglect. 
B. Meritorious Defense 
When moving to set aside a default judgment, the moving party must not only meet the 
requirements ofl.R.C.P. 60(b) but must also plead facts which, if established, would constitute a 
defense to the action. Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563. It would be an idle 
exercise for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real justiciable controversy. Id. 
The defense matters must be detailed. Once a default has been entered the pleading of a 
defensive matter must go beyond the mere notice requirements that would be sufficient if pled 
before default. Id. at 63, 156 P.3d at 564. Factual details must be pled with particularity. Id 
Barraza asserts that the district court erred in ruling that he failed to plead facts which, if 
proven to be true, would entitle him to an interest in the ranch. The district court found that "the 
lien says we're not claiming any ownership of that property any longer." The district court thus 
ruled that Barraza' s claims regarding the prior written agreement did not establish a meritorious 
defense. The lien referred to in the district court's ruling was attached to Cuevas' complaint and 
appears to have been a form document for a mechanics lien. 5 Barraza apparently attempted to 
fill out the document such that it asserted a claim against the property for "the unpaid refund in 
the amount of $20,000 for the payments on real estate title." Cuevas' complaint alleged that, if 
the lien was a mechanics lien, the statute of limitation to file a foreclosure action on the lien had 
passed pursuant to I.C. § 45-510. The complaint further alleged that, if the lien was based upon a 
breach of contract action, the time to file such an action, pursuant to I.C. §§ 5-216, 5-217, had 
expired by the passage of five years since the time when Barraza was aware of such a claim. The 
complaint sought to have the lien released from the property, to have title quieted against all 
other claimants, and to have damages awarded for slander of title. The default judgment quieted 
title in Cuevas as against the claim asserted in the lien and stated that Barraza and Garza "shall 
have no further right, title or interest in and to the real property." 
5 A mechanics lien is a "statutory lien that secures payment for labor or materials supplied 
in improving, repairing, or maintaining real or personal property." BLACK'S LAW 




(- To establish a meritorious defense, Barraza had to allege at least one claim demonstrating 
that he had an interest in the ranch such that title should not be quieted in Cuevas. In the 
responsive pleading, Barraza did not claim any interest under the lien nor even refer to it; rather, 
he alleged that Cuevas entered into a written contract to sell the ranch to Barraza for $80,000 on 
March 6, 2001, and that Barraza paid $22,635.76, as a down payment. Barraza claimed that 
Cuevas breached the written contract for sale of the ranch by filing the instant quiet title action. 
Pursuant to LC. § 5-216, an action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing must be filed within five years. A cause of action for breach of contract 
accrues upon breach for limitations purposes. See Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 830, 11 
P.3d 20, 26 (2000); Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 180, 484 P.2d 728, 729 (1971). The five-
year statute of limitation for Barraza to bring this breach of contract claim began to run when 
Barraza became aware of the breach. The breach alleged in Barraza's answer occurred when 
Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action--April 2, 2007. Barraza filed his answer asserting the 
breach of contract claim less than two months later. If an enforceable contract can be proven, 
this claim would constitute a meritorious defense to the quiet title action because it would ~ 
establish that Barraza has an ownership right in the ranch. If Barraza can prove his allegations 
(_) that he contracted to buy the ranch, he would be entitled to specific performance on the contract. 
See P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 238, 159 P.3d 870, 
875 (2007). 
The district court's finding that the lien disclaimed any right Barraza had in the property 
was clearly erroneous. Nothing in the language of the lien disclaimed any right to the property 
that may have existed at the time Barraza recorded the lien. By filing the lien, Barraza appears to 
have attempted to give notice of his interest in the property in the event that Cuevas failed to 
return Barraza's down payment upon sale of the land to a third party. Barraza did not assert 
below and does not assert now that the lien was ever enforceable. The expiration of the 
limitation period to bring an action attempting to enforce the lien under the mechanic's lien 
statutes, LC. §§ 45-501 to 45-525, did not extinguish any property right created by a written 
contract for the sale of the ranch. Cuevas asserts that Barraza' s actions of vacating the ranch and 
filing the lien establish that he knew Cuevas did not intend to sell Barraza the property and, 
therefore, the breach of contract claim accrued when he signed the lien--April 1, 2002. If 




contract and only filed the lien in order to protect his right to the money he had paid while he 
believed Cuevas was attempting to sell the ranch to a third party. Under that factual scenario, the 
breach did not occur until Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action. 
Cuevas also argues that the documents attached to Barraza's answer, which purportedly 
constitute a contract for sale of the ranch to Barraza, demonstrate that the alleged contract does 
not satisfy the statute of frauds, LC. § 9-505(4). However, Barraza alleged facts which could be 
sufficient to take the contract out of the statute of frauds by application of the doctrine of part 
performance or equitable estoppel. See Chappin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396-97, 162 P.3d 
772, 775-76 (2007); Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1008-11, 729 P.2d 1068, 1071-74 (Ct. 
App. 1986). 
Furthermore, Cuevas is incorrect that Barraza was required to prove the terms of the 
written contract To establish a meritorious defense, a party moving to set aside a default 
judgment is not required to present evidence in order to have the default judgment set aside. 
Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 63, 156 P.3d at 564. The meritorious defense requirement is a 
pleading requirement, not a burden of proof. Id. Barraza was not required to submit the written 
contract into evidence or provide a translation of the portion of the contract written in Spanish. 
Q Barraza was required to plead a meritorious defense with particularity. See id. Barraza pied that 
there was a written contract for the sale of the land and indicated the date of the contract, the 
( 
parties, the real property involved, and the amounts of the down payment and full sale price. 
Barraza asserted that Cuevas breached the contract by filing the instant quiet title action. 
Assuming these facts to be true, Barraza has established a meritorious defense because Cuevas 
breached the contract. 
Although Barraza does not assert that the lien was valid or enforceable, he pied a 
meritorious breach of written contract claim sufficient to warrant setting aside the default 
judgment. We need not address the other allegations contained in Barraza's responsive pleading 
because we have concluded that Barraza asserted one meritorious defense to the quiet title 
action. After the default is set aside, Barraza's additional affirmative defenses and counterclaims 
will more properly be addressed by the district court in the first instance. 
C. Attorney Fees 
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. §§ 12-120, 12-121, and 





attorney fees. A party must provide argument in support of a request for attorney fees on appeal. 
See Weaver v. Searle Bros., 131 Idaho 610, 616, 962 P.2d 381, 387 (1998). See also I.A.R. 
35(a)(6). We therefore decline to address both requests for attorney fees. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court abused its discretion in ruling that Barraza failed to demonstrate 
mistake or excusable neglect. The district court also abused its discretion in ruling that Barraza 
had not pled a meritorious defense to Cuevas' quiet title action. We therefore reverse the district 
court's order denying the motion to set aside, vacate the default judgment, and remand to the 
district court for further proceedings. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Barraza. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCURS. 
Judge LANSING, DISSENTING 
Although I agree with the majority that Barraza has adequately alleged a meritorious 
defense, I would affirm the district court's holding that he failed to show that his default was the 
product of excusable neglect. 
A motion to set aside a default judgment under this rule is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and we therefore will not disturb the trial court's order in the absence 
of an abuse of discretion. Clear Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 123 Idaho 141, 143, 845 P.2d 
559, 561 (1992); Tyler v. Keeney, 128 Idaho 524, 526, 915 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Ct. App. 1996). ' 
Excusable neglect is "a factual question ... which 'must be answered by examining what might 
be expected of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances."' State, Dep't of Law 
Enforcement v. One 1990 Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 680, 889 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(quoting Herzinger v. Lockwood Corp., 109 Idaho 18, 19, 704 P.2d 350, 351 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
Thus, on appeal we examine the district court's determination as to whether the litigant "engaged 
in conduct which, although constituting neglect, was nevertheless excusable because a 
reasonably prudent person might have done the same thing under the circumstances." 
Schraufnagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 754, 747 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Here, the only evidence purporting to explain Barraza's inaction after service of the 
complaint was presented through the affidavit of his attorney, which states: 
2. That Defendant discussed this case with me, and paid me for my legal 
advice; however, at that time, no lawsuit was filed and therefore I could not file a 





3. A Complaint was later filed and Defendant was served with the 
Complaint, but did not tell me, thus, no Answer and Counterclaim was filed. 
4. Defendant believed that I was representing him after our discussions 
regarding the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did not need to 
let me know that a lawsuit had been filed and a lady had given him papers as 
service of process. 
5. Defendant speaks very little English, cannot read or write English, and 
thus did not understand the notice in the Summons requiring him to file a 
responsive pleading within twenty (20) days. 
From this affidavit we are informed that at some unidentified time prior to 
commencement of the action, Barraza talked to his lawyer about the dispute but did not contact 
the lawyer after Barraza was served with process. We are told he believed that he did not need to 
notify the lawyer about service of the complaint, but we are given no basis upon which he could 
have formed such a mistaken belief. We are also informed that because of a language barrier, he 
did not understand the notification in the summons requiring a responsive pleading within twenty 
days, and from that we can infer that he did not ask anyone to translate the document for him. 
In my view, the district court was well within the bounds of its discretion in finding that 
these facts do not describe conduct "which would be expected of a reasonably prudent person 
under the same circumstances." I am not unsympathetic with the difficulties confronted by a 
non-English-speaking person who is thrust into the complexities of the American legal system, 
but a language barrier, standing alone, cannot justify ignoring service of process. Reasonable 
diligence in that circumstance would require that an individual at least obtain the services of an 
interpreter who could explain the content of the document. Although Barraza might have had a 
legitimate reason to expect that his attorney would protect his interests without notification from 
Barraza when process was served, the evidence presented in support of the motion to set aside 
the default judgment discloses no reason, much less a reasonable one, for such a belief. A recent 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court indicates that if a defendant who was served with a 
complaint retains a lawyer to represent him in the action and the lawyer fails to do so, excusable 
neglect is shown, Idaho State Police ex rel. Russell v. Real Property Situated in the County of 
Cassia, 144 Idaho 60, 156 P.3d 561 (2007).1 That is not what occurred here, however, for the 
evidence indicates Barraza did not ask the attorney to do anything after the complaint was filed. 
This Idaho Supreme Court decision appears to implicitly overrule an Idaho Court of 




For these reasons, I would affinn the district court's denial of Barraza's motion to set 
aside the default judgment. 
where we stated that ''the neglect of an attorney is attributed to the client; unless the attorney's 
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COMES NOW plaintiff/counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas, by and through 
undersigned counsel of record, and answers and responds to Defendant Bernardino Barraza's 
Request for Admissions, First Set of Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents 
as follows: 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
REQUEST NO. 1: Please admit that you never had a written agreement to 
purchase the property in question herein. 
RESPONSE NO. 1: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Please admit that at the time you agreed to purchase the 
property from Juan Cuevas, you were aware that Juan Cuevas had previously sold the property to 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. 
RESPONSE NO. 2: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Please admit that at the time you agreed to purchase the 
property from Juan Cuevas, you were aware of the lawsuit between Juan Cuevas and Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, over the ownership of the property. 
RESPONSE NO. 3: Deny. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. l: If you denied any of the above Requests for 
Admissions, please explain the facts and basis for any denial. 
ANSWER NO. 1: At the time Plaintiff agreed to purchase the property in 2003, 
Plaintiff was not aware of any enforceable contract or agreement whereby Juan Cuevas sold 
property to Bernardino Barraza. Instead, Plaintiff was only aware that Barraza had previously 
lived on the property and that Barraza had since vacated the property. 
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Also, at the time Plaintiff agreed to purchase the property in 2003, Plaintiff was 
(~~, not aware of any lawsuit between Juan Cuevas and Bernardino Barraza, and Plaintiff only later 
learned of a lawsuit that was subsequently filed in April 2007 by Juan Cuevas to remove a cloud 
placed upon the title by Bernardino Barraza. 
() 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: State the name, address and telephone number of 
each person who has relevant information about this dispute. With regard to each person, state a 
brief synopsis of the information that person possesses concerning this matter. 
ANSWER NO. 2: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it (i) 
invades the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, and other evidentiary 
privileges and (ii) requires the identification of information beyond the scope of discovery 
insofar as it requests Plaintiff to provide information beyond the "identity and location" of 
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. 
Subject to and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff states as follows: 
1. Juan Cuevas, location unknown. Mr. Cuevas knows about the agreement 
with Plaintiff and the quitclaim deed. · 
2. Yrene Baez, 5019 West Edgemont Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85035, 
602-412-6076. Ms. Baez knows about the quitclaim deed. 
3. Amalia Perez, 104 West Belmont, Caldwell, Idaho 83605, no telephone 
number. Ms. Perez is Plaintiffs sister and was a witness to the agreement 
between Juan and Plaintiff. 
4. Ismael Perez, 104 West Belmont, Caldwell, Idaho 83605, no telephone 
number. Mr. Perez is Plaintiffs brother-in-law and was a witness to the 
agreement between Juan and Plaintiff. 
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5. Oralia Luna, 17769 Quiet Springs Ave., Nampa, Idaho 83687, 
208-713-5436. Ms. Cuevas is Plaintiffs sister and was a witness to the 
agreement between Juan and Plaintiff. She loaned money to Plaintiff for 
the purchase of the property. 
6. Pedro and Maria Cuevas, 5016 Oxbow Ave., Caldwell, Idaho 83607, 208-
455-1038. Mr. Cuevas is Plaintiffs brother and was a witness to the 
agreement between Juan and Plaintiff. He loaned money to Plaintiff for 
the purchase of the property. 
7. Benito V. Juarez, 27750 Sand Rd., Parma, Idaho 83660, 208-899-5757. 
8. 
Mr. Juarez is a friend who loaned money to Plaintiff for the purchase of 
the property. 
Nerio Marruquin, 3311 Dorman Ave., Caldwell, Idaho 83605, 
208-899-6513. Mr. Marroquin is a friend who loaned money to Plaintiff 
for the purchase of the property. 
9. Pay Cuevas, address and telephone number unknown. Ms. Cuevas is 
Plaintiffs niece and is living in Mexico. Ms. Cuevas loaned money to 
Plaintiff for the purchase of the property. 
10. Martin Navarro, Jr., 20374 John Lane, Caldwell, Idaho 83607, 
208-412-5328. Mr. Navarro is Plaintiffs son-in-law and Vicky's 
husband. Mr. Navarro loaned money to Plaintiff for the purchase of the 
property. 
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11. Juan Gomez, 5135 Denton St., Boise, Idaho 83706, 208-941-6325. 
Mr. Gomez is Plaintiffs son-in-law and Lourdes' husband. Mr. Gomez 
loaned money to Plaintiff for the purchase of the property. 
12. Wilfrido Cuevas, Jr., 29452 Pearl Rd., Parma, Idaho 83660, 208-722-
9901. Mr. Cuevas lived with Plaintiff at the time that the contract was 
made and continues to live with Plaintiff. Mr. Cuevas is Plaintiffs son 
and has contributed money toward the purchase of the property. 
13. Amy Cuevas, 29452 Pearl Rd., Parma, Idaho 83660, 208-722-9901. Ms. 
14. 
Cuevas lived with Plaintiff at the time that the contract was made and 
continues to live with Plaintiff. Ms. Cuevas is Plaintiffs daughter-in-law 
and has contributed money toward the purchase of the property. 
Mayra Cuevas, 29452 Pearl Rd., Parma, Idaho 83660. Ms. Cuevas lived 
with Plaintiff at the time that the contract was made and continues to live 
with Plaintiff. 
15. Jose Cuevas, 29452 Pearl Rd., Parma, Idaho 83660. Mr. Cuevas lived 
with Plaintiff at the time that the contract was made and continues to live 
with Plaintiff. 
16. Lourdes Cuevas, 5135 Denton St., Boise, Idaho 83706, 208-570-9523. 
Ms. Cuevas is Plaintiffs daughter and lived with Plaintiff at the time that 
the contract was made. 
17. Vicky Cuevas, 20374 John Lane, Caldwell, Idaho 83607. Ms. Cuevas is 
Plaintiffs daughter and lived with Plaintiff at the time that the contract 
was made. 
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18. Julio Cuevas, 5201 Friar Drive, Caldwell, ID 83605, (208) 407-9549. 
Mr. Cuevas lived with Plaintiff at the time that the contract was made. 
Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this answer with discoverable 
information that later becomes available. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the name, address and telephone number of 
each person you intend to call as a witness at the hearing of this matter. With regard to each 
witness, state the substance of the facts to which you expect the lay witness to testify. 
ANSWER NO. 3: Plaintiff has not determined who he may call as witnesses at 
the hearing of this cause, but Plaintiff may call any or all of the individuals listed in answer to 
Interrogatory No. 2. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this discovery response. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Separately identify each person whom you may 
call as an expert witness at the trial of this action. With regard to each expert, also state: 
1. The expert's qualifications (i.e. educational background, occupation, 
licenses, etc.); 
2. The subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; 
3. The substance of the opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; 
and 
4. The underlying facts and data upon which the expert opinions are based. 
ANSWER NO. 4: Plaintiff is unsure at this time which experts he may call at 
trial. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this discovery response and intends to comply 
with the stipulation regarding scheduling deadlines. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe each document or exhibit you intend to 
introduce at trial. 
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ANSWER NO. 5: Plaintiff has not yet detennined those documents, objects, or 
(-~ things, if any, he intends or expects to introduce as an exhibit at the trial of this matter, but states 
that he may use any documents attached hereto or otherwise produced in this action. Plaintiff 
reserves the right to supplement this discovery response. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please list any payments you claim to have made 
for the purchase of the property. 
.. 
ANSWER NO. 6: Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 33(c), see copies of 
receipts evidencing money transfers attached hereto as bates no. WC0042-WC0055. See also list 
summarizing total payments made attached hereto as bate no. WC000l. Plaintiff does not 
remember the dates the payments were made. Right after Plaintiff agreed to purchase the 
property, Plaintiff gave Juan Cuevas a 1985 suburban, an accordion, a guitar, and cash toward 
the purchase of the property. Plaintiff does not remember how much cash he gave Juan Cuevas 
() when he gave Juan Cuevas the non-cash property. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please list any improvements you claim to have 
made to the property. 
ANSWER NO. 7: Improvements include the installation of a new pump and 
motor for drinking water, repairs to a septic tank and broken pipe, and the addition of rocks for a 
gravel road. See copies of receipts attached hereto as bates nos. WC0002-WC0004. Plaintiff 
also installed new pipes to get water from a canal to the fields, and he hired someone to cover the 
canal so children would not fall in. He does not have receipts for the later improvements. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please state all detail of your agreement to 
purchase the property including such provisions as purchase price, tenns, method of payment, 
etc. 
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ANSWER NO. 8: In August 2003, Plaintiff agreed to make monthly payments of 
(~: $800 or more toward the purchase of the property. Plaintiff and Juan Cuevas agreed that the 
purchase price would be $80,000. They also agreed that Plaintiff could begin living on the 
property. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please state the date you first became aware that 
Juan Cuevas agreed to sell the property to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. 
ANSWER NO. 9: Plaintiff learned of a document that identifies Barraza and Juan 
Cuevas and discusses the sale of the property when Plaintiff visited the Canyon County 
courthouse to pay taxes on June 12, 2009. Plaintiff had no prior knowledge of any sale of 
property to Barraza. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please state the date you agreed to purchase the 
property from Juan Cuevas. 
ANSWER NO. 10: August 2003. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: If your response to any request for production 
herein is to deny the possession of the requested document(s), describe each and every document 
which exists, to your knowledge, that would be responsive to the request, and each fact or 
circumstance which supports your assertion that such document are not available to you, 
including the date or dates such documents were removed from you possession. 
ANSWER NO. 11: Plaintiff does not deny possession of any requested document 
that exists. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
REQUEST NO. 1: Please produce copies of any and all documents you relied 
upon and/or identified in your answers to each of the above-stated interrogatories. 
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RESPONSE NO. 1: See copies of all documents attached hereto as bates nos. 
c:· WC0001-WC0060. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Please produce copies of any and all documents evidencing 
payments made by you to Juan Cuevas for the purchase of the property. 
RESPONSE NO. 2: See copies of receipts evidencing money transfers attached 
hereto as bates nos. WC0042-WC0055 and list of cash payments attached hereto as bates no. 
WC000l. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Please produce copies of any and all documents, contracts, or 
agreements between you and Juan Cuevas relating to the property. 
RESPONSE NO. 3: Plaintiff has no purchase agreement to produce because the 
Plaintiff entered into an oral agreement with Juan Cuevas. Nevertheless, see copies of receipts 
attached hereto as bates nos. WC0042-WC0055 evidencing the wire transfers attached hereto as 
Q evidence of performance of the oral agreement. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Please produce copies of any and all documents you may 
introduce as an exhibit at trial. 
RESPONSE NO. 4: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 5. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
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ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
I have read the foregoing ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, know 
the contents thereof and that the same are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and 
belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30 day of August, 2010. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at J.J,.4,,,,;,:/;.ot.AA, ~ 
My Commission Expires (0 .,,.{C> ... , f-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of August, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF~s ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANT BERNARDINO BARRAZA'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, FIRST SET 
OF INTERROGATORIES, AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS to 
be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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Payments of3 years 
Loans 
Benito Juarez #(208) 899-5757 
Pedro Cuevas # (208) 455-I 038 
Oralia Luna# 713- 5436 
Nerio Marroquin # 899-6513 
Pay Cuovas #No number 
Martin Navarro # 412-5328 
Juan Gomez# 510-9523 












Total - $32,467.00 
Wilftido Cuevas 
29452 Pearl Rd 
Parma Idaho 83660 
00037'7 
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RECElVED 
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;n THOMAS, BARRETT· 
MOitcK &. F\ELOS, Cl-lTD. 
TOTAL - $72,467.00 
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Parma, ·ID 83660 
BUS. 722-6248 
ro= lu, {FriJ. o. Cuer/~s 
. (jJ frY7,11 4 J ~ ' 
WE ARE PLEASED TO QUOTE A~ FOLLOWS: 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
~ ... 'j.,o-t,9 ];AV" l!.t0.AA,..I ~ ~ _(\ ,L t" ~ L,, ,,-
• .Jj . - r , l . - ., 
k 
(,) .d "1 "'1 Iv'~ () r o. , "" _ r > .,-,,/ .,J 
IH~:) ~ _.oq r ., .. . . 
{J..,y l\ L- .... -- /J1'.,,;, 
# 1/ ( 
A 
f ,///kn r 




/J)~ . .l/ ,a; /G;u/-
ff " n-- - . ;/ -
IA1 // r; Zr·, ... ·t .,.. ,, -
r,;, , 207903 
Olil::L HO 0~ 











OFFICIAL SIGNATURE / J;:; (,1 ~) ABOVE PRICES ARE GOOD FOR DAYS 






I - _, 
I ·,r : . -·~ ,· 
! .... ... 
I • ., 
I -- ...... 
I .,,,. .;r 
I · ..... ,t( 
! . -,> 
0 • v 
0 
( 
MODE:F AC'J'ION: TRQK729 . ' ----=------------===--=----=-=----=--=~----==--==----=-=------=-=----=-=--~----= . 
System User- STEPHENS Date 09/17/2009 Time 
Account Number 
CUEVAS, JUAN M 
& BAEZ, YRENE 
2003 TAX PAYMENT DETAIL 
SEC l9-6N-SW SE 
TAX 2-B IN SWSE 
12:53 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 29452 PEARL RD, PA 
================•==•===================== 
Date Pd Packet/Trans 
TX 03/19/2004 403020 70 




























CANYON COUNTY TAX RECEIP.T . 










CUEVAS, .JUAN M 
· & BAEZ YR ENE 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID a3660 
T.RQZ707b 
Interest 
· . 11.79 
Cost .oo . 
March 19,._:200 














CANYON COUNTY TAX RECEIPT. 
CHECKS SUBJECT TO BANK.CLEARANCE 
2003 Real ~ • 
Ac:count # 111111111111111 Parcel # 06N0SW198800 · 
Site addressz 29~52 PEARL RD; PA 
Tax 
19a.20 Late ChQ 3.97 
CUEVAS, .JUAN M 
& BAEZ YRENE · 
· 29452 PEARL' RD~ 
PARMA ID 8~~~\ 
TRQZ707b ~o\tlV5' 
-Interest Cost 
s. 25 ·• 00 
I~~ .· 
·:· ~RANSACT!ON .. 
Marc:h 19. 200 
·Packet: # 02007 
~ ... 
I l 













CANYON COUNTY TAX RECEIPT. 
CHECKS SUB.JECT TO BANK CLEARANCE 
2003 Manuf i.aa 
Account# • P~rcel # 6N5W19~70473 
Site address: 29452 P~AR~ RD, PA 
Ta,< 
114.50 
Late Chg .oo 
TRQZ707b 
CUEVAS,. .JUAN OR 
BAEZ YRENE 
291+52 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID ~3660 
Interest .oo Gost .00 
.June 11+ 2004 














.. .. ... Q 
,.. ____ ,_1111111!" ________ ii" ····· ............... -.. . :---.-
. . 
2003 Real ~ • 
Account# .......... 
CANYON COUNTY·TAX RECEIPT 
CHECKS SUB3ECT TO BANK CLEARA~C~: 







29452 PEARL RO . D 
PARMA._·ID 83b60 ~f /I 
TRQZ7 07 b (f\;,)~1 ~ LJt: . 
.Jun.e ·14 2004 
Packet # 041065. 
Total Paid 
483.00 





system User- DARBIN Date 09/17/2009 . Time 13:37 
04 TAX PAYMENT DETAIL 
Account Number 
CUEVAS, JUAN OR SEC 19- SE 
BAEZ, YRENE 
24ES3803 29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 1972 BROADMORE (24 X 60) 
========================================= 
Date Pd Packet/Trans 

















MODE:F ACTION: TRQK729 
c======================-======================================================== 
system User- DAR.BIN Date 09/17/2009 Time 13:36 
Account Number 
CUEVAS, JUAN M 
& BAEZ, YRENE 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 
2004 TAX PAYMENT DETAIL 
SEC 19-6N-5W SE 
TAX 2-B IN SWSE. 
29452 PEARL RD, PA 
========================================= 
Date Pd Packet/Trans 
TX 12/27/2004 412L04 20 





















MODE:F ACTION: TRQK729 
======================================-======-=-=========-=:==========~~======== 
System User- DARBIN Date 09/17/2009 Time 13:37 
Accowit Number 
CUEVAS, JUAN OR 
BAEZ, YRENE 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 
2005 TAX PAYMENT DETAIL 
SEC 19- SE 
248$3803 
1972 BROADMORE (24 X 60) 
=-=----=--=-=-=====-----=-===---=----=-=-
Date Pd Packet/Trans 
















MODE:F ACTION: TRQ1<729 
==c=========~=================================================================== 
System User- DARBIN Date 09/17/2009 Time 13:36 
Account Number 
CUEVAS, JUAN M 
&: BAEZ, YR.ENE 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 
2005 TAX PAYMENT DETAIL 
SEC 19-6N-SW SE 
TAX 2-B IN SWSE 
29452 PEARL RD, PA 
~=====~=======~========================== 
Date Pd Packet/Trans 















.MODE:F ACTION: TRQK729 
=====-====--=--=---------=------------------=--------------.-----==--=-=======-~ 




29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 
· 2006 TAX PAYMENT DETAIL 
SEC 19- SE 
24ES3803 
1972 BROADMORE (24 X 60) 
========================================= 
Date Pd Packet/Trans 
















MODE:F ACTION: TRQK729 
--==-=-------~-=-----------------------===-=--=-==--==-------=----------=--===== 
system User- DARBIN Date 09/17/2009 Time 13:37 
Account Number 
CUEVAS JU.AN M 
BAEZ YRENE 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 
2006 TAX PAYMENT DETAIL 
SEC 19-6N-5W· SE 
TAX 2-B IN SWSE 
'29452 PEARL RD, PA 
---------------=-==-==~=-=-==~----=--=---
Date Pd Packet/Trans 
TX 03/31/2007 703V01 4 






















• I I ION AP~1JCATTON ~ ASSESSOR 
: C,\NYON COUNTY APPLlCATION ACCOUNT SR ·,; vl36D ·· OCO ·-' ·4 {) 
NUMBER ' : JiOR O\VNER-OCCUP[ED 
. Rl(SIDK~TIAL li\lPROVEM F.NT 
. EXEl\lPTION (SE<· t,J-<,02c;, ldahoc·rn1c) 
L 
t t • 
29462 PEARL RD 






T AA 2.a IN SWSE T70473 
Site: 29462 PEARL RD PA ID PA 
FOR TAX YEAR: ZOOS 
OWNER-OCCUPIED RESIDENTIAL 
!PROVEMENTS (Ch~ck one of the following) 
1gle Family Dwelling 
1ltl-family Dwelling 
1plex, Triplex, etc.) 
1rtments or Condominium 
rnfactured Home 
\merclal Improvement 
.a Living Quarters 
I am the owner or am purchasing and occupy, as my 
primary dwel.Ung place, the residential improvement 
· or manufactured home herein described. 
1---------------1 I AFFIRM THAT I AM NOT RECEIVING 








THIS EXEMPTION ON ANY OTHER 
RESIDENTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE 




OCCUPIED: ~~&.C.:::::==:~ PRICE: S 




I certify that to the best of my knowledge and beUef, and under the penalty of perjury, that the information I 
have provided herein is true and correct. 
:, 
OWNERS SIGNATURE:, "· 
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY: 
l)L.E:\SI: Fll.l. I\ Hl(,Hl.lGH fED .\RE.-\S. rHE\ ~j{~.A:-,..o l~t) I ..ll.~ ri-I1s 
.\f>Pt.lC.\ rrn~. f!.!t:. ,SSESSOR ·s OFFICE \Vil.I.. RE fLRN. RY \l.\i.l.:~.,\ Sl(i\ED ;\;'iQ 
PATED COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS. 








HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION APPLICATION 
,-----




I IMPROVEMENT EXEMPTION 
(SEC (i3-G02G, ld:1ho Code) 
OWNER-OCCUPIED RESIDENTIAL 
IMPROVEMENTS (Ch8ck 0/18 of the 
fol/owing): 
Single Famlly Dwelllng_ 
MultJ..famlly DweJllng_ 
, 
1 (Duplex, Trlplex. etc.) 
Apartment or Condominium 
Manufactured Horne 
Commercial Improvement 




-·-r-- . . . 
I ,• /, 
FOR TAX YEAR 
. ,, ;, . ·I , , . . ~ .. 






. ,,.t' •• •. • 
. ·.· 
I am the owner or am pwchaalng and 
OCCUP.Yt1:fi my primary dwelling place, lhe SITE. ADORE_ SS (House Number & s1.....:t) rwalcle~I et.Improvement or the manufactured , ...... 
honle hemlhidllsldt r,. . : ,.v 
1
1 AFFIRM l"HAT I AM NOT RECEIVING 
lHIS EXEMPTION ON ANY OTHER 
1 
RESIDENTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE 











Counly UH only 
I County Notified 
I lvea 
WORK PHONE 
NUMBER Rented Owned No 
I certify that to the beat of my knowledge and bellef. and under the penalty of perjury. that the 
Information I have provided herein Is true and correct, , 
. OWN'ER'S SIGNATURE DAT! .• ' •'" • • I , .• 
FOR COUNTY USE ONLY 
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY ' . ./ DAT! 
APPLICATION FOR THIS EXEr.·1PTION r.'.UST BE MADE ON OR BEFORE APRIL 15TH TO THE COUNTY 
ASSESSOR, 1115 ALBMJY ST, CALD'I/ELL, ID 83G05 TEL: 454-7431. 
PLEASE RETURN ALL "3" COPIES OF YOUR HOMEOWNERS EXEMPTION APPLICATION. 
WE WILL ~ETURN YOUR SIGNED AND DATED PIN~ COPY BY MAIL. 
000393 WC0017 
'•, ,,, .. 
" 
t-J"{ 1/ ... . , .... .. . . . 
CANYON COUNlY ASSESSbR 
.. . . 
MANUFACTURED HOUSING DEPT, . '. · MANUF.AcrtJRED--HOUSiNti 
1115 Alpany St. Rm. 343 · &..~ VALORl!M· FORM 
· Galdwell, ID 83605 (208} 454·7447 
,, 
DATE: / STICKER#: R~L~tf :) .·~.1 Trl].E #: ... . I i / ,. ... , , . ---... , .. --, I : '/ ··-:1 . ./: .:)':; J ·-; I i-,. ;· ,_:/.:,,: ,,~ ~ ... / .I .' . ...,,,,. ,~J { ~- -• ./ t ·' I , . 
MODEL: YEAR: · SIZE: iD#: 
i,::;/ '; I ,, : ; ,': );'. . . ' ...., , ,. .. ', 1 ' ' ,\.,, ~ I .. ,.~ I / L .• .._;..., .c>1 l i..-,,.-;-;...,_;.,_ ..:, .1..";lf '· .... 'l.i .. .. , ... a"'· . . . .,,..,_ .. 
, ~- ADD/DELETE NAME ,. NPT.MOVING ) IN/Olff COUNTY MOVE ~~~N ~ ... -··· ..... .-. .. -..... 
REPO/SPEOAL DEALER INVENTORY TRADE·IN DEALER CONSIGNMENT 
' OWNERSHIP~fATUS LOCATION STATUS 
FR,OM: (SElLER) PRESENT: SEC I t TWN 1 A/ RGei? ; QTR 
I . 
l' 
: .,,,.,.: ; \,,.~ 
-~· i' . : . , : '·-..: MH 'PARK or SUB .•. '····· .... SP# or LOT & BLK- ··, ,. 
l ... . ,. ' .. : CITY, COUN1Y /"'{.,fl., 'JI' ¥__.. ~f-'J .. • • .... ,.,/'' ~·: ~-· . ,.,.,.. .. .• ,,, ' 
..... • ! ... 
MAIUNG ADDRESS: ,.- ' DESTINATION: SEC TWN RGE dTR 
-; ·;·, ., s ,·: r: MH PARK or SUB . •,I i i/·- 4,,,,,,.r ... . ,· SP# or LOT & BUC 
F' , ·' ····. : 
~ 
,· :,,; ,./ .~ ..... CITY, COUNTY, STATE t' J ,,_:,,&.. ..... . . ... 
TO: (BUYER) RfALACCT# ... ;, ., LANDOWNER , ,,.l ' '., .. ) .. :. ~ ,.~./ .. ,. .  
SITE ST or RD 
CODE AREA PHONE#--.· 
MAIUNG ADDRESS: P & Z APPROVAL YES .·. NO . . f·. ' 
Purchase Amount s ., ...... ~ ·. '·\ - J oate: .. ; ,: .... ·:! / ~:.~ I :; .. • I 
J' ,>•' MHonlv Wlltf.Land . 
J-..1 ii,., ...... ,: 
_. ; ' ; ' .. ·~ il Delete MH Imps . .1:. f/:rt' . ' KeepMH Imos ~ t $• ,. ·i ..... ,• I 
REMARKS: 
,· PLEASE COMPLETE FORM WITHIN 30 DAYS OF ISSUE DATE , .. 
\,.~_,.,.,·' Property Taxes In Arrears? (YES) or (NO) Amount$ 
........ i/ : .. : , . . ~ ...... 
( 
, f ·-:..;_··'i>repald Property Taxes for current Vear , . ... , 
! ... 2Q . <.: 1.:.} Amount$ ! \,..· 17. ,)-v ~ . -
I 
Home9Wners Exemption: t / I CODE AREA I # ~ ... 
~,,.-~-
..:_.J .. 





Manufactured Home Value: I,~ CANYON couNry( ' I ·- I . .' 
; ~. .. \ ..• ·~· / 'l'AXES f'AIO ' ,. I 
TOTAL ADJUSTED VALUE F-11-P-DAT.E _ 
J ,: 
.. 
:AFTER EXEMPTIONS: $ I ;; '~; t' } ... 






' ,t--·•-,-..... < .. -.t, ,, .. ./. ,'.; .. (./ . • ......... , ,,, . ·-1' Y.i . .. ./ 




CANYON COUNT: .;oNSOLIDATED PROPERTY 1. 
TRACIE LLOYD 
CANYON COUNTY TREASURER & TAX COLLECTOR 
FOR TAXING DISTRICTS OF CANYON COUNTY (208)454-7364 
: BILL 2007 PROPERTY TAX 
REGULAR ROLL 
DUE DATE: 
·MARCH 20, 2008 
70473000 0 
1619 ***************3-DIGIT 836 
1111 I 11,II, ,II 11,11111 I 1111 II 111,ll, 11 llil1 ,I,, I ,I III l ,Ill 11, I 
WILJl'RIDO CUEVAS 
29452 PBARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660-6338 
PIN: 
Property Description: 
19-6N-5W SB R39350000 
BROADMORB 24 X 60 VIN 24ES3803 
TITLB C531744 
Property Addreas: 








THIS JS A LISTING OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT YOU PAY EACH TAXING DISTRICT, INCLUDING BONDS, 
OVERRIDES ANO CERTIFICATIONS IF APPLICABLE. CALL THE NUMBER LISTED oaow WITH 
QUESTIONS REGARD1NG lltE TAXING DISTRICT ANO lltE CHARGED AMOUNT. 
IF YOU HAVE SOLD THIS PROPERTY OR A MORTGAGE 
COMPANY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING THIS TAX, 
Pl. E'MF. FQRWARO THIS BILL IMMEDIA":"£1. Y, 
l, I • • ' - ' I ' • ' ' • • • • \ 
I •,I, ) •I• i I '-JI i C 4•,i I • • '• ' ' ' • , • . • • • • • , ' • t , r' :· ~II', ' I I I I~ ! 
. . . '' .. ,, ' - •• . • '~, -· ' • •. .!._:,.,_~•.,1, L'•l !!1•i . .. ! 
112 08'1' 
553 AM!IULA11C3 DI 
03 HWY 2 
715 l'ADA. Jill:B 
7 35 :PARKA. CJDDTll 
759 PARKA SCBL l 
no CAllYOl'f cOtJlff 
TOTAL TAX BlllEO; 
N1V~ PAYMEHn PRIOR TO l®t/2007: 
STA TE APPRCNFIJ PROPER'tY TAX REDUC'T10tt 
I KEEP TOP PORTION FOR YOUR RECORDS! 
fvi5Ke cHEcKs·PAYABt.E ro: 1 cANvoN couNrvTAX coLLEcroR 
. · Tracie Lloyd · 
11AR- i!O 20011 
DELINQUENCIES: 
PIN: 70473000 o 
1115 Albany SI., Room 342 
P.O. Box730 









QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR ASSESSED 
VALUE? CALL THE ASSESSOR AT 
(208) 454-7431 
IF AAY PORTION OF THE TAX BECOMES DELIN-
QUENT A 2% LATE CHARGE WILL BE APPLIED. 
INTEREST ON THE DELINQUENT 
BALANCE Will ACCRUE AT 1% PER MONTH, 
DATING FROM JANUARY 1ST, 
WHEN PAYING DELINQUENT BALANCES, PLEASE 
CALL (208)454-7354 FOR THE CORRECT AMOUNT 
DUE INCLUDING LATE CHARGE AND INTERES11 
MONTHLY PAYMENTS ARE ACCEPTED 
-IMPORTANT*** 
PLEASE READ BOTH FRONT AND BACK OF 
THIS NOTICE 
TO AVOID LATE CHARGE & INTEREST, THE 
FULL AMOUNT OR FIRST HALF TAX MUST BE PAID 
IN PERSON OR HAVE A U.S. POSTMARK 
NO LATER THAN 
MARCH 20, 2008 
CREDIT CARD PA MENTS ACC ED VIA INTERNET OR 
BY DIALING H00-272-9829 ANO ENTERING YOUR BILL 
NUMBER ANO JURISTICTION CODE #2214. WE ARE 
CURRENTl Y UNABLE TO PROCESS CREDIT CARO 
· I 1 1 J / ~• ! ' f • ' 'j • ' 'j • l , -"' I I "' 1 • Y • 1,' 1,' ' ' 
i(' ;,, F I' !)u' ! ,· I/• ·11,•,I !' ·1_,)(, ,. oj: 1·1, 
p.' I-', ~ ; 1,,l,1l \• J '11 • r ' l) 1 \'•',;l\j ' I ;1' 
,,l l,'1 : 1·1 r . 'I'' ! J I I ',:. 
[JW _____ o_.o_o__, 
llli _____ o_._o_o_. 
7D4730ao oaoaoaooaoaoooaaooooo 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS 
29452 PBARL RD 





Gene T Kuehn 
Canyon County Assessor 
111 5 Albany St. - Room 343 








THIS IS NOT A BILL. 
DO NOT PAV. 
For any questions, please notify tho Assessor's Office Immediately 
Annual - Real Property 5/28/2008 
Assessor's Telephone Number: 208-454-7431 
Parcel Address: 
29452 PEARL RD PA ID 
51709 *****************5-DIQIT 83660 Appeals of your property value must be flied In 
wTllklg, on a form provided by !he County, by: ll,,l11,ll11ll111ll11ll,111ll1111ll,11ll,l,,l,,l,l11,l,lll,ul 
CUBVAS WILl'RIDO 6/23/2008 
29452 PEARL lU) 
PARMA ID 83660-6338 Tax Code Area: 049-00 
Pr. . • rnber: 
ALT PIN: 
ASSESSED VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY 
CURRENT DESCRIPTION LOTS/ACRES LAST YEAR'S VALUE CURRENT YEAR'S VALUE 
12 Total Rural res tract Mkt Vi ~lue 55,560 55,560 
32 Mkt Value 7,100 7,100 
SUBTOTAL: 62,660 62,660 
LESS HOMEOWNERS EXEMPTION: 15,000 
NET TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUE: 62,660 47,660 
These values may not Include personal property vakl111. Taxes are baaed on the values shlJWII on this Notloe and on the Budgets of the laxlr-Q dlstrtcls. 
TAXING DISTRICT INFORMATION 
TAXING DISTRICTS PHONE NUMBER DATE OF PUBLIC 
BUDGET HEARING 
653 AMBULANCB DISTRICT 208-466-8800 8/13/2008 
998 CANYON COUNTY 208-454-7507 8/13/2008 
693 NOTUS-PARMA HWY #2 208-722-5343 8/12/2008 
736 PARMA CEMETERY 208-722-5343 8/7/2008 
715 PARMA J!'IRE 208-722-5745 8/13/2008 
768 PARMA SCHOOL DIST #137 208-722-5115 6/9/2008 
112 PBST CONTROL 208-454-7507 8/13/2008 
7 7 5 COLLBGB OP WESTERN IDAHO 208~562-3299 Budget Hearb 
120 INTERIM MOSQUITO ABATEMENT 208-454-7507 8/13/2008 
THIS IS NOT A BILL. DO NOT PAY. 





Gene T Kue, .. , 
Canyon County Assessor 
1115 Albany St. - Room 343 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
2008 
ASSESSMENT NOTICE 
THIS IS NOT A BILL. 
DO NOT PAY. 
PARCEL DESCRIPTION: 
70473000 0 
For any questions, please notify tho Assessor's Office immediately 
Annual - Real Property 5/28/2008 
19•6N-5W SB R3 Assessor's Telephone Number. 208-454-7431 
9350000 0 1972 BROADMORB 24 X 60 
VlN. 24BS3803 TITLB C53l744 Parcel Address: 
29452 PEARL ltD 
6N5W19SBROOOO 
*****************5-DIQIT 83660 
11 .. 1 ... 11 .. 11 ... 11 .. 11 ... 
Appeals of your property value must ba flied In 
wrlUng, on a form provided by lhe County, by: 
COEVAS ·W:tLP'lUDO 
29452 PEARL BJ> 
PABMA ID 83660 
6/23/2008 
Tax Code Area: 049-00 
I', ' iuinber: 
ALT PIN: 
ASSESSED VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY 
CURRENT DESCRIPTION LOTS/ACRES LAST YEAR'S VALUE CURRENT YEAR'S VALUE 
46 Mfg housing 12,700 13,700 
SUBTOTAL: 12,700 12,700 
LESS HOMEOWNERS EXEMPTION: 6,350 
NET TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUE: 12,700 6,350 
These value, may 11011nclud1 peraonat p,operty valuee. Tax111 are band on the va~H stlown on 11111 Notice and on the Budgelt of the taxing dlllrlctt. 
TAXING DISTRICTS 
653 AMB~ANCB DISTRICT 
998 CANYON CO'ONTY 
693 NOTUS-PARMA HWY #2 
736 PARMA CBMBTBRY 
715 PARMA ll'IRB 
768 PARMA SCHOOL DIST #137 
112 PEST CONTROL 
775 COLLEGE OU WESTBRN IDAHO 
120 INTERIM MOSQUITO AJ3ATBMBNT 











THIS IS NOT A BILL DO NOT PAV 
See the back of this Notice for detalls 
000397 















CANYON COUNTY CONSOLIDATED PROPERTY TAX BILL 
TRACIE LLOYD 
2007 Reminders 
Regular Tax Roll 
DUE DATE: 
CANYON COUNTY TREASURER & TAX COLLECTOR 
FOR TAXING DISTRICTS OF CANYON COUNTY 
P.O. Box 730 
Caldwell, ID 83605 Phone: (208)454-7354 
39350000 0 
nAVDI 
14749 ******•******S•DIGIT 83660 
ll11l111ll11ll,11ll11ll1111ll111,ll111ll,l11l11l,l111l.lll111I 
WILP'RIDO COBVAS 
29452 l?BARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660-6338 
- 2007 2007078165 
KEEP TOP PORTION FOR YOUR RECORDS! 
WILJl'RIDO CUEVAS 
29452 ·P-1!:AXL RD 
PARMA ID 83660-6338 








29452 PEARL RD PA ID 
Total Taxable 62,660 
To Pay by Credit Card 
,lilcw.··· Visit www.offlclalpayments.com 
Or call 1-800-2PAY-TAX (800)272-9829) 
I Use Jurisdiction Code 2214) 
0.00 o.oo 500.00 313.98 
... 0. uO 
IBM 313,98 
313,98 
MAKE CHECKS PAYABLE TO: I 
llul111IJ,,f l11ll1111ll11llml111l11ll,flmnll11f1111l11JI 
CANYON COUNTY TAX COLLECTOR 
Tracie Lloyd 
1115 Albany St., Room 342 MAY 30 i!DD6 
P.O. Box 730 





Gene T Kuet 
Canyon county A~sessor 
1115 Albany St. - Room 343 




R39350000 0 1972 BROADMORE 24X60 V 
:tN 24BS3803 TITLE CS3l744 
6N5Wl92MH7 
\ .•. , _ _,_.,, 
2009 
ASSESSMENT ~0TlCE 
THIS IS NOT A BILL. 
DO NOT PAY. 
For any quesUons, please notify the Assessor's Office Immediately 
Annual - Mobile/Leased 5/22/2009 
Assessor's Telephone Number: 20 8 -454-7 431 
Parcel Address: 
29452 PB.ARI, RD 
4330 *****************5-DIGIT 83660 Appeals of your property value must be tiled In 
wrnlng. on a form provided by the County, by: 
ll11l111ll11ll111llull1111ll1111llmll,l11l11l,l111l1lll11,I 
CUBVAS WILFRIDO 
29452 PEARL lU) 6/22/2009 
PARMA ID 83660-6338 
Tax Code Area: 049-00 
Pi, - . l)lber: -
ASSESSED VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY 
CURRENT DESCRIPTION LOTS/ACRES LAST YEAR'S VALUE · CURRENT YEAR'S VALUE 
46 Mfg housing 0 10,300 
SUBTOTAL: 10,300 
LESS HOM!OWNERS EXEMPTION: 5,150 
NET TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUB: 5,150 
These value, may not Incl.Ide personal proper!)' valuee, Taxes are based on Ille valuea stwwn on lhla Notice and on the Budgets ol lhe taxing dblilcl1. 
TAXING DISTRICT INFORMATION 
TAXING DISTRICTS PHONE NUMBER 
653 AMBULANCE DISTRICT 208-466-8800 
998 CANYON COONTY 208-454-7507 
668 MOSQUJ:TO Al3ATEMENT 208-461-8633 
693 NOTUS~PARMA HWY #2 208-722-5343 
736 PARMA CEMBTERY 208-722-5343 
715 PARMA Jl'IRB 208-722-5745 
768 PARMA SCHOOL DIST #137 208-722-5115 
112 PEST CONTROL 208-454-7507 
775 COL~EGB or WESTERN IDAHO 208-562-3299 
THIS IS NOT A BILL. DO NOT PAY. 
See the back of this Notice for details 
000399 
















PAYMENT RECEf PT 
Type Description 
Real Property BIii Number: 2007078165 
BIi Ya PIN: 
AIN: 
Primary er: FRIDO 
CUEVAS 
Property Addr: 29452 PEARL RD 
PAID 
Property Oesc: 19-6N•5W SE 








By Whom Paid: 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS 
712035 
29452 PEARL RD 














Fees/Late Currant Current Balance 
Balance Net Tax Interest Charges Due Paid Remaining 
813.98 500.00 0.00 0.00 500.00 500.00 313.98 
813.98 500.00 0,00 0.00 500.00 500.00 313.98 
Charge Summary: 
500.00 Real Property 500.00 ..... _____ 

















Ty pe D rl ti eac p on 
Real Proper1y BIii Number: 2007078165 
BUIYear: 2007 
AIN; PIN:~ 
Primary wnar: RIDO 
CUEVAS 
Property Addr. 29452 PEARL RD 
PAID 
Property Desc: 19-6N-6W SE 






By Whom Paid: 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS 
805020 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 
,,.,,P 
Received By: Cashler3 Receipt Number: 
Location: COUNTY Receipt Year: 
Session: Cashler3-Cashier3-05292008-0 Date Received: 




FeellLate Current Current Balance 







313.98 0.00 0.00 





























Personal Property BIii Number: 2008300636 
BIIIYear: 2008 
PIN:~ 
Prlmaiy ner: C STUCCO 
COMPANY 
Property Addr: 29462 PEARL RD 
..... u ................. - ............. -
Real Property Bill Number: 2008153769 
BIii Year: 2008 PIN:-AIN: 7 
Primary wner: ILFRIDO 
CUEVAS 
Property Addr: 29452 PEARL RD 
Property Dase: 19-6N·6W SE 
R39350000 0 1972 BROADMORE 
24X 
.............. - -----·---
Real Property BIii Numben 2008153501 
BIii Year: 2008 
PIN:~ AIN: 
Prtmary wner: RIOO 
CUEVAS 
Property Addr: 29452 PEARL RD 
PAID 
Property Dase: 19-6N-5W SE 






By Whom Paid: 
AMY CUEVAS 405-9616 
812067 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 
Received By: Cashler5 Receipt Number: 




Location: COUNTY Receipt Year: 
Session: Cashler5-Cashler5-12192008-0 Date Received: 
Feea/Late Current Current Bal._nce 
Balance NetTax Interest Charges Due Paid RemQlnlng 
24.30 24.30 0.00 0.00 24.30 24.30 0.00 
-•-•••"••-•••n•• .. ••n•,u•• --·-----, .......... ••••••••••-••••••• .. oou,,,,uoo,ou,, .. n_..,,,,on••---··•-••••••-.-•o 
78.08 78.08 0.00 0.00 78.08 78.08 0.00 





300.44 0.00 0.00 


































CANYON COUNTY CONSOLIDATED PROPE 
TRACIE LLOYD CANYON COUNTY TREASURER 
1115 Albany St, Room 342 FOR TAXING DISTRICTS OF CANY 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
RTYTAX BILL 2008 Personal Property Tax 
& TAX COLLECTOR 
REGULAR ROLL 
ON COUNTY DUE DATE: 
DECEMBER 20, 2008 
(208)454-7354 
3875 64936614 0 ......... 3-DIGIT 836 
PtC06 
ll11l111ll11llmllull11111l1111llmll1l11lul,l111l,lll111I 
ATTN WIL CUEVAS 
we STUCCO COMPANY 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660-6338 
PIN: 
Bill. NUMBER: 2008300635 
Property Description: 
Property Address: 







TrllS iS A USTING OF i'Hi: TOTAL AMOUNT YOU f'A'Y eAQ-1 TAXING OIS1RICT, INC1.UOING BONDS, 
OVERRIDES AND CERTIFICA'TIONS IF APP.UCABl.E. CONTACTn-tE AGENCY USTI:D BELOW'\Mlli 
QUESTIONS REGARDING 1liE TAXING DISTRICT AND l1-IE CHARGED AMOUNT. 
IF YOU HAVE SOLO lHIS PROPERTY OR A MORTGAGEi° 
COMPANY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING THIS TAX. 
PLEASE FORWARD 1HIS Bll.L IMMEDIA'Ta Y. ··---~----- - ---- - - -
-- --- - -- - - -- - - - . - - - - - . - - - - -· . . .. -
112PEST 
120 INTERIM MOSQ 
653 AMBULANCE DI 
~HWY2 
715 PARMA ARE 
738 PARMA CEMETE 
768 PARMA SOI.. 1 
775 COLI.EGE OF W 










KN1'HCI! PA'l'Me'fTS PfUOft TO 1001/2008: 
STATE APPRO\IED PR0PEJ{T'r TAX RmJC'T10N: 










QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR ASSESSED 
VALUE? CALL THE ASSESSOR AT 
{208) 454-7 431 
IF ANY PORTION OF 'THE TAX BECOMES DELINQUENT A 
2% LATE CHARGE WILL BE APPLIED. 
INTEREST ON 1HE OELINCllJENT 
BAU\NCE Wll.L ACCRUE AT 1% PER MON'Tl-1. 
DATING FROM JANUARY 1ST. 
WHEN PAYING OeLINQUENT BALANCES, PLEASE CALL 
(208)454-7354 FOR lHE CORRECT AMOUNT DUE 
INCLUDING LATE CHARGE AND IN'TERES11 
MONTHLY PAYMENTS ARE ACCEPTED 
-IMPORT~ 
PLEASE READ BOTH FRONT AND BACK OF 
TlilS NOTICE 
TO AVOID LATE CHARGE & INTEREST, THE 
FULL AMOUNT OR FIRST HALF TAX MUST BE PAID 
IN PERSON OR HAVE A U.S. POSTMARK 
NO LATER TliAN 
DECEMBER 20, 2008 
Credit Card payments are accepted via the lntemet at 
www.canyonco.org/treasurer/aspx or can be accepted In 
person at the office. A nominal fee is charged by the 






· --~CANYON COU .;CONSOLIDATED PROPERTY · BILL 2ooaREALPROPERTY 
TRACIE LLOYD '--"' CANYON COUNTY TREASURER & TAX l _LECTOR t-:-:-_R_EG_U_LA_R_TA_X_R_O_L_L~ 
. . 1115 Albany St., Room 342 FOR TAX.ING DISTRICTS OF CANYON COUNTY DUE DATE: 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 DECEMBER 20, 2008 
(208)454-7354 -P-IN_: ___ _ 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 
DECD6 
Bill NUMBER: 2008153169 
Property Description: Code Area: '------i=~~ 
19-8N-5W SE R3935000001972 
BROADMORE 24X80 VIN 24ES3803 TITLE 
C531744 
Property Address: 










THIS IS A USTIIIIO. OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT ·YOU PAY EACH TAXING DlSlRICT, JNCLUDING BONDS, -IF YOU Hl\VE SOLD THIS PROPERTY OR A MORTGAGE 
CvMP.ANY IS Re'SPONSIBLE FOR' PAYING THIS TAX, OVERRIDES AND CER'nflCAllO.NS IF APPLICABLE. CONTJliCT TI:tfi !\G.ENC.Y USTI::D Blal,OW 'MTH · 
QUl!Sl19NS REGARDING THI! TAXINQ'DISTRICT ANO'THE CHARGED /\M9UNT. ·. 
112PEST 
120 INTERIM MOSO , 
853 AMBULANCE DI 
8831-fNY2 
716 PARMA FIRE 
736 PARMA CEMETE 
7118 PARMA SC.HI.. 1 
m COUEGE OF W 



















. · PLEAS!; FORWARD THIS BILL IMMEDIATELY. 
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR ASSESSED 
VALUE? -CALL THE ASSESSOR AT 
(208) 454-7431 
IF ANY PORTION OF THE TAX BECOMES DELINQUENT A 
2% LATE CHARGE WILL BE APPLIED, . 
INTEREST ON lHE DELINQUENT 
BALANCE VlnLL ACCRUE AT 1% PER MONTH, 
DA11NG FROM JANUARY1ST. 
VI/HEN PAYING DELINQUENT BALANCES, PLEASE CALL 
(208)454-735'4 FOR THE CORRECT AMOUNT DUE 
INCLUDING LATE CHARGE AND INTERt:S 
MONTHLY PAYMENTS ARE ACCEPTED 
... IMPORTANT"• 
PLEASE READ BOTH FRONT AND BACK OF 
THIS NOTICE 
TO AVOID LATE CHARGE & INTEREST, THE 
FULL AMOUNT OR FIRST·HALF TAX MUST BE PAID 
IN PERSON OR HAVE A U.S. POSlMARK 
NO LATER THAN 
DECEMBER 20, 2008 
Credit Card payments are accepted via the Internet at 1----------------------------- www.canyonco.org/treasurer/aspx or can be accepted In 
ADVN¥;.f!. PAYMENTS PRIOR TO 11/0112008: person at Iha office. A nominal raa Is char~d by the 
STAT! APPRO',/EO PROPERTY TAX· REOUC1ilON: processor ror this service. 




CANYON CO , CONSOLIDATED PROPE 
TRACIE LLOYD _,.1 CANYON COUNTY TREASURER 
1115 Albany St., R_oom 342 FOR TAXING DISTRICTS OF CA 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
(208)454-7354 
R .JBILL 2008 REAL PROPERTY 
&TAXL _LECTOR REGULAR TAX ROLL 
NYON COUNTY DUE DATE: 
DECEMBER 20, 2008 
PIN: 39350000 0 
c:~= BILL NUMBER: 2008153501 
Property Description: !Code Area: MQ.M 
0 
19-6N-5W SE TAX 2-B IN SWSE TT0473 
ttcoa 24038 39350000 0 ......... 5-DIGIT 83660 
Property Address: 
II,, 1 ... 11 •• 11 ... 1 I, ,I I 111,I la III II III II al 11 l1, I, I, 111,111 Ill I 29452 PEARL RD PA ID 
WILFRIOO CUEVAS 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660-6338 
11i18 IS A LISTING.OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT YOU ,,w EACH TAXING OISlRICT, t~;C'I.UDING BONDS, 
.OVER~l~ES ANO CER~lf.lCATIONS IF APPi.JC.A.Ei.:::, ::; ... ~!r,Wr-fflc AGl:NOY-i.13TI,.; .!l!l.OW·V\m'I 
. • QUES110NS REGARDING 1HE TAXING OIS1RICT AND THE CHARGED AMOUNT. 
112 PEST 
120 INTERIM MOSQ 
653 AMBULANCE DI 
693HYVY2 
716 PARMA FIRE 
738 PARMA CEMETc 
788 PARMA SCH. 1 
ns COLLEGE OF w 











MJVAMCE PA'fMENTS PAlOR TO 11I011'Z008: 
STA re APPROVED PROPERlY TAX. REDUCl10N: 






















IF YOUHA::esoi.D 'THIS PROPER1Y QB_~ MOBJ!l~"' l 
. -::~~Vli"AN'I · I$ tU:SP\JNSlt:1lt: 'ftik"1iAYIR<TlfllS"TA)(,"" ~ ~-
PLEASE f=9RWAAOTHIS BILL IMMEDIATELY. 
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR ASSESSED 
VALUE? CALL THEASSESSORAT 
· (208) 454-7431. 
IF Af4Y PORTION OF lHE TAX BECOMES DELINQUENT A 
2o/o LATE CHARGE Will BE APPLIED, 
INTEREST ON THE DeUNQUENT 
BALANCE WIU ACCRUE AT 1% PER MONTH, 
DATING FROM JANUARY 1ST. 
WHEN PAYING DELINQUENT BALANCES, PLEASE CALL 
(208)-45+7354 FOR 1liE CORRECT AMOUNT OU!! 
INCLUDING LATE CHARGE AND INTERESTI 
MONTHLY PAYMENTS ARE ACCEPTED 
... IMPORTANT"• 
PLEASE READ BOTH FRONT AND BACK OF 
THIS·NOTICE 
TO AVOID LA.TE CHARGE & INTEREST, THE 
FUl,L AMOUNT OR FIRST HALF TAX MUST BE PAID 
IN PERSON OR HAVE A U,S; POSTMARK 
NOLATERiHAN 
· DECEMBER 20, 2008 
Credit-Card payments are aoc;epted· via the Internet at 
www.canyonco.orgnreasurerlaspx or can be aceepted In 
~rson at the office. A nominal fee 19 charged by the 
processor for this service. 
· . ·· .. 
WC0029 
( 
CANYON COU r\l. '"ONSOLIDATED PROPERTY 2007 REAL PROPERTY 
REGULAR TAX ROLL TRACIE LLOYD V . 
CANYON COUNTY TREASvRER & TAX COLLECTOR DUE DATE: 
FORT AXING DISTRICTS OF CANYON COUNTY (208)454-7354 DECEMBER 20, 2007 
39350000 0 
20940 **•********•*5-DIGIT 83660 
I I II I 111 I I, 11 I 111 I I II II 1111 I I, 11, I I,,, 11, I,, I, 1 I, Im I, I II, 11 I 
WIL!'RIDO CUEVAS 
29452 PEARL RD 




AX 2-B IN SWSB T70473 
Property Address: 








THIS IS A LISTING OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT YOU PAY EACH TAXING DISTRICT, 1NCLUDING BONDS, 
OVERRIDES AND CERTIFICA TlONS IF APPLICABLE. CALL THE NUMBER L ISTFO BELOW Wlnl 
\.lut:ii l)uN;ii r'ttUAl<UINU '!'HI:: !_AXING DISTRICT )\ND THE CHARGED AMOUNT,. 
IF YOU HAVE SOLO THIS PROPERTY OR A MORTGAGE 
COMPANY IS RF.SPONSIBI..F. FOR PAYINA THI$ TAX 
PLEASE FORWARD THIS Bill IMMEDIATB. Y. 
112 PBS'l' 
5 5 3 AMBOLANCB DI ' 
693 BWr 2 
7·15 PA1lNA 'l'IU 
7 3 6 PARMA CIDOITB 
7 68 PAJOIA SCIIL 1 
991 CAIITOH COlJN'l' 









QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR ASSESSED 
VALUE? CALL THE ASSESSOR AT 
(208) 454-7431 
IF ANY PORTION OF THE TAX BECOMES DELIN-
QUENT A 2% LATE CHARGE WILL BE APPLIED. 
INTEREST ON THE DELINQUENT 
BALANCE WILL ACCRUE AT 1% PER MONTH, 
DATING FROM JANUARY 1ST. 
WHEN PAYING DELINQUENT BALANCES, P.LEASE 
CALL (208)454-7354 F9R THE CORRECT AMOUNT: 
DUE INCLUDING LATE-CHARGE: ANO INTEREST!" 
MONTI-IL Y PAYMENTS ARE.ACCEPTED 
-IMPORTANT""* 
PLEASE READ BOTH FRONT AND BACK OF 
THIS NOTICE 
TO AVOID LATE CHARGE & INTEREST, THE 
FULL AMOUNT OR FIRST HALF TAX MUST BE PAID 
IN PERSON ·OR HAVE A U.S. POSTMARK. 
NO LATER THAN . 
ADMINISTRA ADJ MENT: DECEMBER 20, 2007 
TOTAL TAX BILLED: CREDIT CARD PAYMENTS ACCEPTED VIA INTERNET OR 
ADVANCE PAYMENTS PRIOR TO 10I01/2007: BY DIALING 1-800-2n-9829 AND ENTERING YOUR Bill 
STATE APPROVED PROPERTY TAX. REDUCTION: NUMBER AND JURIST1CT10N CODE #2214. WE ARE 






w~@~ 0 @ (OO@~~~~~w-~ ~~~, c@,~~~~F~~=-:,,=--




·Tor Water User 
Wilfrido Cuevas 
29452 Pearl Rd. 
Parma ID 83660 
Shareholder 
Yrene Baez & Juan Cuevas 
Cert. No. 3589 No. ot Share1~ 
DATS OP' BT~TBKINT I March 22, 2007 
DAT.II 
NO, OP ASSBSSMBNT ASSESSMBMT 
DATB 
l/lt/07 
SHARSS PIIR SHARB IS DUB DEBIT CREDIT 
0.5 $18. 00 April l5, 2007 • • $ 18 00 
PLEASE NOTE 1HAT WE HAVE A NEW MAILING ADDRESS: P. O, BOX 729, PARMA, ID 836&9 
WE ALSO HAVE A NEW SECRETARY-TREASURlR:SHEIIA SEEMAN. 
(MINIMUM ASSESSMENT PER SHAREHOLDER IS $18.00.)· 
PLEASB PAY LAST AMOUNT SHOWN IN BALANCE COLUMN. 
PAYMENT MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE BUSINESS OFFICE 
NO LATER THAN 4:30 P,M. ON THE DUE DATE 
The shareholder shall no longer be entitled to receive water from 
the Company if payment .is not made within forty-five (45) days after 
•• 
it is due. Assessments that are not paid by the assessment due date 
will become delinquent. Pursuant to the By-Laws, nonpayment for sixty 
{60) days after due, the shares shall be subject to sale for nonpayment 
of delinquent assessments, together with interest at a rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annum, from the date of deliquency, costs of notice 
and expenses of the sale, 
ACCOUNT IS SUBJECT TO AN INTEREST CHARGE 
ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE AFTER APRIL 25, 2007 
The interest charge la computed at a periodic rate of 1\ p,,Y month 










00@)]}§~~:TI:W wi~©fil OOE®])~ 
BOX 729, PARMA ID 83660 
(208} 722-5044 
STATEMENT ., 
TO, Water User 
Wilfrido Cuevas 
29452 Pearl Rd. 
Parma ID 83660 
Shareholder 
Yrene Baez & Juan Cuevas 
cart. No. 3589 No. of Sbarea__Q_,_a 








IS DVB DEBIT CREDIT 
3/8/01 0,5 $22. 00 HovalOl>ar 25, 2008 • $ u.oo 
. . 
PLEASE IIOTE THAT WE HAVE A NEW MAILING ADDRESS: P. O. BOX 7Z9, PARMA, ID 93810 
{MINIMUM ASSESSMENT PER SHAREHOLDER IS $22.00.) 
PLEASB PA¥ LAST AMOUNT SHOWN IH BALANCB COLUMN. 
PAYMENT MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE BUSINESS OFFICE 
NO LATER THAN 4130 P,M. ON THE DUB DATE, 
The shareholder· shall no longer be entitled to receive water from 
the Company if payment is not made within forty-five (45) days after 
it is due, Assessments that are not paid by the assessment due date 
will become delinquent. Pursuant to the By-Laws, nonpayment for sixty 
(60) days after due, the shares shall be subject to sale for nonpayment 
of delinquent assessments, together with interest at a rate of twelve 
percent (12,) per annum, from the d~te of deliquency, costs of notice 
and expenses of the sale. 
ACCOUNT IS SUBJECT TO AN INTEREST CHARGE 
ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE AFTER NOVEMBER 25, 2008 
The interest charge Ja computed at a pe~lodic rate of II per month 





WARM~!} s COOJPDATIW DITORl eo~~i?~ 
P. 0. BOX 729, PARMA ID 83660 
TOI Water User 
Wilfrido Cuevas 
29452 J;learl Rd. 
Parma ID 83660 
Cort, No. 3~ 
STATEMENT 
Shareholder 
No, ot Sbaraa~ 
Date of statement: December 7, 2008 
KO. or ASSBBSMBIIT 
DATB SKARBS PBR SHARB 
DATB 
ASSESSNBHT 
IS DUB DBBIT CRBDIT BALAIICB 
10/1/01 G.S $22.00 NoveJOber 25, 2001 '$ 22.00 
11/16/01 Interaat Charge• A••••••d to date l 00 
(MINIMUM ASSESSMENT PER SHAREHOLDER IS $20 . 00.) 
The shareholder shall no longer be entitled to receive water from the 
Company if payment is not made within forty-five (45) days after it 
$ 2J. ~o 
Is due. Assessments that are not paid by the assessment due date will 
become delinquent. Pursuant to the By-Laws, nonpayment for sixty 1601 
days after due, the shares shall be subject to sale for nonpayment of 
delinquent assessments, together with interest at a rate of twelve 
(12%) per annum, from the date of delinquency, the costs of the notice 
of sale and expenses of the sale. 
The interest charge is computed at a periodic rate' of 1\ per month 









OOQ)~~fflffl m)dt~ ~~ . ~ ~ 
BOX 729, PARMA ID 83660 -d' ~(\ 
c2os> 122-so44 r_f,s 
STATEMENT 
T01 Water User 
Wilfrido Cuevas 
29452 Pearl Rd. 
Parma ID 83660 
Shareholder 
Yrene Baez & Juan Cuevas 
C•-ct. No. 3589 No. of Sh•ro&~ 






PER SHARR IS DUB DBBIT CRBDXT 
10/11/09 0,5 $32.00 April 25, 2009 $ 22. 00 
PLEASE NOT£ THU WE HA\IE A NEW MAILINB ADDRESS: P. o. BOX 72!1, PARMA, ID smo 
(MINIMUM ASSESSMENT PER SHAREHOLDER IS $22.00.} 
PLBASB PAY LAST AMOUNT SHOWN IN BALANCB COLUM}I. 
PAYMENT MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE BUSINESS OFFICE 
NO LATER THAN 4130 P,M. ON THE DUE DATE, 
The shareholder shall no longe~ be entitled to receive water from 
the Company if payment is not made within forty-five (45) days after 
it is due. Assessments that are not paid by the assessment due date 
will become delinquent. Pursuant to the By-Laws, nonpayment for sixty 
(60} days after due, the shares shall be subject to sale for nonpayment 
of delinquent assessments, together with interest at a rate of twelve 
percent (12\} per annum, from the date of deliquency, costs of notice 
and expenses of the sale, 
ACCOUNT IS SUBJECT TO AN INTEREST CHARGE 
ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE A11'TER APRIL 25, 2009 
The interest charge is coinputsd at a periodic rate of l\ ;,e, 1110nth 





f~O@ ©@XQ)~~'gl~ ID)dh~ ~~ 
P. 0. BOX 729, PARMA ID 83660 r~-0=~ 
(208) 722-5044 m.;1;~ 
:STATEMENT 




29452 Pearl Rd. 
Parma ID 83660 
Yrene Baez & Juan Cuevas 
Cert, No, 3589 No. of Sharea~ 




1«1. OP ABSBSSKBNT ASSBSSMIINT 
SKAJIBS PBR SKAJ\B IS PJIB DBBXT CRllDH. 
o. 5 uo.oo ~ril 25, 200B $ 20.00 ' 
PLEASE NDTt THAT WE KAVE A NEW MAILIND ADDRESS: P. O. BOX 728, PARMA, m 1366D 
(MINIMUM ASSESSME™T PER SHAREHOLDER IS $20.00.l 
PLEASB PAY LAS'l' AMOU?l'l' SHOWN I}f BALANCB COLmOI. 
PAYMENT MUST BB RECEIVED IN THE BUSINESS OFFICE 
NO I.ATER THAN 4130 P,M. ON THE DUE DATE. 
The shareholder shall no.longer be entitled to receive water from 
the Company if payment is not made within forty-five (45) days after 
it is due. Assessments that are not paid by the assessment due date 
will beoome delinquent. Pursuant to the By-Laws, nonpayment for sixty 
(60) days after due, the shares shall be subject to sale for nonpayment 
of delinquent assessments, together with interest at a rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annU111, from the date of deliquency, costs of notice 
and expenses of the sale. 
ACCOCNT IS SUBJECT TO AN INTEREST CHARGE 
ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE AFTER APRIL 25, 2008 
The interest charge ia computed at a periodic rate of 11 per month 
(annual percentage rate of 121) with a minimum charge of $1.DO. 
20.00 
00041.1 WC0035 
Manatron GRM-PropertyDetaptask- ROTaxlnfoView Page 1 of 1 
I MANATRflN. 
PIN: TAG: 049-00 -,(current owner: DABMZA U8HABl2JH~ 
AlN: TIF: Ownership Sole Ownership type: 
Status: Active Case: ~ltus address . 29452 PEARL RD PA ID 
Geocode: Plan: Description: 19-&N-SWSE 
Rev acct: 0000656044 Roll type Real Property Class: 512 - Rural resldentlal tracts 
Year/BIii ! ~oo~-2008153501 }l~ I *Counter~ .#f Print I Print Stmt I BIii Detall Total Due -~~{1?/2009. im 
Pre vi ow) In.st 2-June 20 $300.44 
BIii type: Orlglnal Owner of record: 
Total Current $300.44 
,() 
.,..BIii dates: NnvAmhor 24 ')ntlR.. 
CUEVAS WILFRIDO 
Delinquent $0.00 
/ 29452 PEARL RD 
( 
PARMA ID 83660 Adv/Surplus $0.00 
Amount: $300.44 
Total Due $300.44 
), 
Paid date: December 19, 2006 Communication: 
UQB,5191 'l. (; (} 7 0 l{ 3 (,I ~ 7 Values/Exemptions 
) Land Assessed 55,560 
Receipt: 
Sequence no: 3 Impr Assessed 7,100 
2. ()(! 'l e, I 'Y1 S-1 
Paid by: AMY CUEVAS 405-9616 Total Assessed 62,660 
( Exempt Value 15,000 Decal no: 
~ Net Taxable 47,660 Lender: . 
r~:3 DRAIN#3 Units 90.6800 • 




Description: 19·6N·SW SE TAX 2·8 IN SWSE T70473 
Assessment Summary Detail 
Gross Tax Credits Net Tax Tax Savings Total Credits/Savings 
600.88 o.oo 600,88 184.42 184.42 









Status: Active Case: 
Geocode: Plan: 
Rev acct: 0000656044 Roll type 
049-00 
Real Property 
Current owner: BARRAZA BERNARDINQ 
ownership Sole Ownership 
type: 
Situs address 29452 PEARL RD PA IQ 
Description: 19·6N-5W SE 
Class: 512 - Rural residential tracts 
Year/BUI I .2?.~~-~~~~7~?.~-~~~---: j *Counter* Print I Print Stmt I BIii Detail Total Due !_09/17/2009_1 imm 
Total Current $0.00 
BIii type: Orlglnal Owner of record: 
f.,.-, ..... ._ ... ___ °' ___ M __ , ·-~----••• _, .... -----••• 
Delinquent $0.00 
CUEVAS JUAN M :- ........ ~.~---------.. · ~- ~-----··· 
BIii dates: l'::l!llll:IDbl:t 26, 2002 Adv/Surplus $0.00 
l 29452 PEARL RD .. , ............. '. ' .... '' ... 
$313.98 
PARMA ID 83660 Total Due $0.00 
Amount: 
Paid date: May 29, 2008 Communication: Values/Exemptions 
Receipt: UQZ,16414 
Land Assessed 55,560 
lmpr Assessed 7,100 
Sequence no: 1 ---·--·---------------Total Assessed 62,660 -----~-· ···~--
Paid by: WILFRIOO CUEVAS Exempt Value 0 --~ ... '• .... ' ..... -·· .... ··-··,. ... ,_,..,_. .. ·- ... 
Net Taxable 62,660 
Decal no: ·----





Description: 19-6N-5W SE TAX 2-B IN SWSE T70473 
Assessment Summary Detail 
Gross Tax Credits Net Tax Tax Savings Total Credits/Savings 
813.98 o.oo 813.98 0.00 0.00 








Status: Active Case: 
Geocode: Plan: 
Rev acct: 0000632654 Roll type 
049-00 
Mobile/Leased 
Current CUEVAS WILFRIDO 
owner: 
Ownership Sole Ownership 
type: 
Situs address 29452 PEARL RD 
Description: 19-GN-SW SE 
Class: 546 - MH w/same owner as land 













Orlglnal owner of record: 
CUEVAS JUAN February 1a. 200s 
29452 PEARL RD 
$182.50 
PARMA ID 83660 




Description: 19-6N-SW SE R39350000 0 1972 BROADMORE 24 X 60 ... 
Assessment Summary Detail 
Gross Tax Credits Net Tax Tax Savings Total Credits/Savings 
162.08 0.00 162.08 o.oo 0.00 
Total Current $0.00 
Dellnqµent $0.00 
Adv/Surplus ($20.42) 
Total Due . ($20.42) 
Values/Exemptions 
Land Assessed 00 ------·-·---···-··---·---... -
Impr Assessed 12,700 
Total Assessed 12,700 ----------·---------~-
Exempt Value 0 --------------
Net Taxable 12,700 
http://ccgnn/GRM - Main - Treasurer/WebUVInt'6oe~i04axlnformation.aspx?CurrentT... U!l6?~09 
() 
( 
Manatron GRM - Property __ ,/Task - ROTaxlnfo View Page 1 of 1 
MANATR_O,N. 
PIN:- TAG: 049-00 
Current CUEVAS WILFRIDO owner: 
AIN: TIF: 
Ownership Sole Ownership type: 
Status: Active Case: Situs address 2i~:i2 et;ARL RD 
Geocode: Plan: Description: 19-6N-5WSE 
Rev acct: 0000532654 Roll type Mobile/Leased Class: 546 - MH w/same owner as land 














Origlnal Owner of record: 
CUEVAS WILFRIDO November 24, 200s 
29452 PEARL RD 
$78.08 
PARMA ID 83660 
December 19, 2008 Communication: 
UOS.5191 Home 722-7560 
Phone: 
2 
AMY CUEVAS 405-9616 
Description: 19-6N-SW SE R39350000 0 1972 BROADMORE 24X60 ... 
Assessment Summary Detall 
Gross Tax Credits Net Tax Tax savings Total Credits/Savings 
78.08 0.00 78.08 · 78.08 78.08 
Total Current $0.00 
. . -~- .. . ... --
Dellnq uent $0.00 
·-----w~-------
Adv/Surpl!JS ($20.42) 
Total Due ($20.42) 
Values/Exemptions 
Land Assessed 00 
Impr Assessed 12,700 
Total Assessed 12,700 
1-----···----------1 
Exempt Value 6,350 -------------·-
Net Taxable 6,350 
TotHmEx 6,350 
http://ccgnn/GRM _ Main_Treasurer/W ebUI/Inf<f ont>f :f ~ax.Infonnation.aspx?CurrentT .. . Wr17J.Jg009 
Manatron ORM - PropertyD ,..,.,,."'cask- ROTaxlnfoView Page 1 of 1 
MANAT.R§N. 
PIN:- TAG: 049-00 Current owner: BARRAZA Bl;Rti!AR12INQ 
AIN: TIF: Ownership Sole Ownership type: 
Status: Active Case: Situs address 29452 fEARL BJ2 PA ID 
Geocode: Plan: Description: 19-0N-!iW SE 
Rev acct: 0000656044 Roll type Real Property Class: 512 - Rural resldentlal tracts 
Year/Bill [ 2008-2008153501 Ill'/ •counter*. fil] Print I Print Stmt I Bilt Detail Total Due [0?{17/2009 Hmm 
Total current $0.00 
-BIii type: Original Owner of record: 
,._ .. _,.,., __ , .. _, __ ,. __ . __ 
Delinquent $0.00 
CUEVAS WILFRIDO 
___ ,.,_ .. .,,_,. _____ , _______ ,H ~---~-·-·· 
BUI dates: ~~~mbec ,1, 2oga Adv/Surplus $0.00 29452 PEARL RD -·- ,. .. . - . .......... ,, ..... ·······-- ·-· 
$300.44 
PARMA IO 83660 Total Due $0.00 
Amount: 
Paid date: June 15, 2009 Communication: Values/Exemptions 
Receipt: UOB.17191 
Land Assessed 55,560 
lmpr Assessed 7,100 
1 
.. _, ___ ,__._ 
Sequence no: Total Assessed 62,660 
Paid by: Exempt Value 15,000 ........ ,. .. _,._,_,_~, .... ··-·"'··-. ' .. -· ··~-----....... ·-·-
BERNARDINO BARRAZA 703-2759 Net Taxable 47,660 -







Description: 19-6N-SW SE TAX 2-B IN SWSE T70473 
Assessment Summary Detail 
Gross Tax Credits NetTax Tax Savings Total Credits/Savings 
600.88 o.oo 600.88 184.42 184.42 
( 





. Type DeacrlpUon 
Peraonal Property BIii Number. 2008300635 BIIIY. PIN: 
Prima . ner: C STUCCO 
COMPANY 
Propertv. Addr. 29452 P!ARL RD 










Feesllate Current Current Baf~nce 
Balance Net Tax Interest Charges Due Paid Remiinlrig 
24.30 24.30 0.00 0.00 24,30 24.30 0.00 
..... -- ··-- ..,. ____ ...... _,.._ •• .,_,...,.,. ____ , __ *•-""4t•• ... --.,•-••---•-,..*----·-·-•-•..,..,..,,.. __ .,._ 
Real Property BIii Number. 2008153769 BUIY. PIN: 
AIN: 
Prlmaiy wner: RICO 
CUEVAS 
Property Addr. 29452 PEARL RD 
Property Oe1c: 19-eN-tiW SI! 
R3\1350000 0 1972 BROADMORE 
. 24X 
-·--···-... ------·--·- ,.._ _______ 




Primary er: RIOO 
CUEVAS 
· Property Addr. 29452 PEARLRD 
PAID 
Property Dfsc: 19-8N-6W SE 






By Whom Paid: 
AMYCUEVAS405~9618 
812067 
29452 PEARL RD 






78.08 0.00 0.00 
300.44 0.00 0.00 
; 

















































( T11161ono dal 
Cllyl~ Counlr/ Polll 
It sending less than $1,000 and the receiver does not have vaUdJdentlflcatlon, complete Iha Test queaUon a11d 
aMW81'. (The maximum amount that can be picked up wlttloul LD. Is $999.99.) 
l 
51 el envfo es menos di $1,000 y el dl>Sflnasarto no c:uenla con""" ld1111llllcad6<> IMllda. fa\ootde anolar I& pnogunla de comprobac,o,,, 
laroapu9Sla, (l,Acanlimdmutrnaqueel_,_~ _.,..,pr.--~ esdlSS§.99.) 
1
1 'Test question (limit 4 words)/ Pr--. do~ (Vmllo 4 pllllns): 
Question/ Preguma Answe~ / AeopuN1I. 
, Optlonat ~ ~ .. ,. ~--,~ __.. o...._.... ..........._ ~ ........ 
C;;;..;)r, w• H,"V..:.oa QisponiolH pc;< ,.m coato ad1donal. Marque al senrldo quo desae: 
0 Include this message --ll*llljo--
0 I wllllt • check deDverecl to the 
following llddl'en (seleded 
International locations only): 
-""'"'---··--~ .. --k-----
0 I want Western Union to ( ) 
telephone the receiver 
CERTAIN TERMS· AHO NDmONS VERNING THE MONEY TRANSFER SERVICE YOU HAVE SELECTED 
ARE SET FORTH ON THE BACK OF THIS FORM. BY SIGNING THIS FORM, YOU ARE AGREEING TO THOSE 
TE'RMS AND CONDmONS. . 
"PLEASE SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING CURRENCY EXCHANGE SET FORTli ON THE 
BACK OF THIS FORM. 
ALGUNOS TERMINOS Y CQNDICIONES QUE RIGEN EL SERVICIO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE DINERO QUE 
USTl:D HA f;U:GIDO, ESTAA ESPECIFICA.DOS EN El. REV£RSO DE ESTE FORMULARIO. AL RRMARLO, 
USTED ESTA DE ACUERDO CON ESOS TERMINOS Y CONDICIONES. 
-POR FAVOR LEA LA INFORMACl6N IMPORTANTE SOSRE CAMBIO DE MONEDA ESPECIFICADA EN EL 
REVERS() DE ESTE FOR~IO. . . . ~-
....---.. 
' ' ' 
Prif8rraCf eustomeT No-.---. ·-t 
Numeto do Cllente ?,-19!1« 
ng oney to . an, em1ar ,r11,oe: 
o•o I t• .. 
USA lnlilmallonal axcludes Mak:o / INemaaoN!les (Ho il1duye e MeidQo) 
.o .... 
Do~~r amount In wcrds" / c.41dadde~ oan lltnl" 
·f ,-i, i' ;;; ;;e,'1,-.~d < •-~: 1 ': ,·-1- 1$ 5'{() 
\Y1MNl se,,dlng $1,000 or !JlOnl, you must provldo proper ldenllffcatlon and additional lnfomiatlon. 
PJ·~ $1,000 6 mes. UOled ~ ,.._...~una ldallllllc,icldn • lnlomlacl6n adlclaMI. 
., . .,. .... . 
., .. 
. • •;.: .. City/~ 
:xpected payout locatlon 
ocelldad dOnde se ~ al pago Clly/Qmd _,_ Co<llloy"/,.... . • • ,· 
sending 18$8 than S1 ,000 and the rOQ81v.ef' does not have valid ldentlfk:atlon, complete tho Test question and 
,swer. (The maximum amount that can be picked up without LD; Is $999.99.) ·1 
01 an"'o es menos de s1.000 y el desUnalallo no cuen1a - LN ~ ...,..._ ,._ de anow la~ c1e OQll'C)!obacl6n y / 
respueslll. (La canlldad rnblm• que el dMllnal&rlo puede recoge, llr\ ~lclenllllcocldn eo da $999.99.) 
,st question (limit 4 words) /Prlgtlnl&dteompr-.Otw4 ~ 
testlon I Preguma Answer/ Rapu8lla · 
tlonal services avallablo at additional cost. Oheck services deSlrep: L ~ 
16::n~!la=..,,=~-::::.:. :dlsponlbl=;:;.:;;;.vs=po1:,___un_C0110_-:-addonal.-,----Motq--ue-el_aervl_clo-""'.C111-.•:---:-::-.-:-".:---::-:-:--:---""'.---:--::-:-:--:---:--:--~~e..----....::l~-i-....,..:,...:..J,;:.;~~~iliilH -~ j Include this mas.sage ~
:nv1e es1a troensaje con dlnoto. 
want a check dl!Uverecl to the 
ollowlng address (seleded 
1tematlonal loc:atlons only): 
want Western Union to ( ) 
kphone the receiver 
fAIN TERMS ANO CON.DfT10NS YE.RNINO THE UONEYTRANSFER SfRYICS HAVE. SEU:OTED 
SET FORTH ON THE BACK OF THIS FORM. BY SIGNING THIS FORM, YOU ARE AGREEING TO THOSE 
CS AND CONDITIONS. 
,se SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING CURRENCY EXCHANGE SET FORTH ON THf; 
, OF THI$ FORM. 
'NOS TERMINOS Y CQNDICIONES QUE RIGEN a SERVICIO DE TRAHSFERENCIA DE Ol£RO QUE 
D HA EL.EGIDO, ESTAN ESPECIFICA.00S EN a REVERSO DE ESTE FOAMUURIO, AJ. FIRIIAAlO, 
:> ESTA DE ACUERDO CON ESOS 'TtRMINOS Y CONDICIONeS. 
FAVOR LEA LA INFORMAC16N IMPORTANTE SOSRE CAMBIO DE t.lONl='IA --·-· • · 










Tota I' OQPo&I too 
LGs~ cash· 
fiat o~)t Ailo~nt . - ~ ' ,. . ·. . 
.... : . . . :· .. : .. 
QQPos.1t 
·-1' $1,00tf,OO U,000.00 
: .. 
Transac:tit11), ·1,t ·00-1 00813 · · · 
Thank ~ou, sanJuar.Ita 
000420 
\!ELLS FARGO BANK 
Trahsa~fion Record 













Transaction n 025 0029 
511-'IPID J0~-'1103 C.red'Hed I J 0/24,,03 





. S FARGO BANK 
;act ion Record 
03 Oerosit 





17104 Cre<llted: 05/17/04 
~ \lei 
N ..... 
lJELl..S FARGO BANK 
Transaction Record 
Store# 04055 04 0ePOSi1 
~ccount Nuaber -038 t !:ash In !850.00 Total Oi:!POSl ted 5850.00 
:..ass Cash 
. 5!0.00 
Net OePos~t Amount $850.00 
Transaction u 009 OOli 
g;'!Sam 04/03/u<I Creilted; 04/05/04 
o ......... . 
lJELLS f'AR{;O BANK 
Tran&action Re~rd 
Store I* {),j£l55 01 OePosit 
Account Nlll!lber -038 C:sh In ., :..:,-(.f $800.00 
Total De.Posited ~ $800,00 
: Less Cash \r ' $0.00 
Net OePQSit Amount i $800.00 
Tr~nsactlon # Q06 0008 
S••Uu 03/2QI04 Crediteii• 0312V04 
laLS FARGO M1K 
Transaction Record 
Store If 04055 02 Deposit 
Account Nmrrber -038 ta.sh In 
'fe; 
$800.tlO 





Net DePosi t f!l:lo,m t ' \ $800, ) 
Transaction# 007 0009 
10:05am 01/24/04 Cred!te<l.: 01/26.IO~ 
\ 
Thank ~ou, crais 
( 










$700 .. 0~ 
07119104 CreqltQd1 07119/04 
• Tan~a 
WELLS FARGO BANK 
Transaction Record 
Store II 05994 02 
Accou Rt Number 
03B 
cash In 
Tota I DePosi ted 
Less cas11 
tX .. Net DePOSH Amount 






4104Pffl os121104 Credlted• 06/21/04 
Thank oou, Ha rel 
000422 
~ELLS FARGO BANK 
Transaction Record 
Store fl 05994 03 Deposit 
-... -Account Number >< 038 ' ' Cash In . $800,00 
Total OePOslted $1110.00 
Less cash $0,00 
Net Oe,:iosl t A1soun t $800.00 
Transaction n 055 0061 








\Jf;LLS FARGO BANK 
Transaction Record 










Net .OePOsi t Amount 









llt46a~ 07119/04 Credited: 07/191()4 
Th.ink YOU, Tan~a 
WELLS FARGO BANK 
Transaetion Record 
Store ii 05994 02 
Account Number 
038 -Cash ln 
Total De.Posited 
Less cash' 
Net Dl!POSlt A11ount 





4:01pm 06/21,104 Credl ted• 06/2V04 
pian k !.!OU , Marci 
llat.S F'ARGO BANK 
Transaction Record 






Net DePosit Amount 






!141Pfi! 05/17/04 Credited: 05/17/04 







I.JELLS FA.QGO B"1NK 
Transaction Rec;crd 
Store U 04055 02 De.:iosit 
Acco1.111t Number 
038 ,-\ II 
;.;J Cash ln 
Total De?Osited 
Less Cash 
Net OePOsit AillOunt 






Team UP for Our Sd·,ools. Ask l!ie hou. 
Thank ;1eu, Crais 
YELLS FARGO BANK 
Transaction Record 





Het DePosi t A111ount 







10157.illl 09/09/04 Credt ted: 09/09!04 
Team UP for Our Schools. Ask me how. 
Thank :IOU' TanYa 
l ~ f{'~<' 
• < 
s/.:J-tS 
wru.s FARGO BANK 
Transaction Record 




· Total De.Posited 
Les.s cas11· 
Het OeJ>osi 1 Amount 'r.; ,.r-
. l ' . j . 
Transaction n 013 0016 
n 
' ' " ,,, 
10=.!9am 08/16/04 Credlted: 08/18/0, 
~ells Farso Bank 
Transaction Record 




Number ot checks 
Total DePOslte<i 
Less Cash 
Het UePOsit_ Amount 






lli43AM 12/20/04 Credited: 12120104 
T~ank ~ou, Shannon 
JJaLS FARGO BANK 
Transaction Record 




iotal DePo.sl ted 
Less ca.sn 
Net DePOSlt Amount 






1120Ptrt 1112210.; cra111 tea: 11122113-i 
Thank ~ou, Marcl 
tJELlS FARGO BANK 
Transaction Record 






Net OSPOSit Al!iount 





$800 .. 00 
3:49Pm 10/21/04 credlte;J1 10121/04 
Team UJ; for our Schools. ASk.me .hcu. 












Well~ Far~o &nk 
Transaction Record 






\ ' $800.00 
Number of checks 
Total OePOsited 
Less cash 
Net DE!P05l t AIIIOl.Hl t 





10:18AM 02119/05 Credited: 02/22/05 
O· 
STORE 1t 05~4 03 
Accoulli ~ 
·00038 
~ I:n · .. 
~ n£ ch~$ 
T'lilai ·1zrosiiai . 
less. Castl· 
·Nei ieJostt tllrlolmt . .· . 
' .... ,. 




· ·ISGG· •. 00 
. . . 
I.Je 11 s F arso Bank 
Transaction Record. 




Number of checks 
Total OePoslted 
Less cash 




f ,~ $800.00 
l\ a ., ~ 
$800.00 
- $1) .oa 
$800.00 
Transaction n 231 0251 
05121PM 01/14/0S Credited:. 01114/05 







lklls Farso Bank 
Transaction Record 
STORE # 05994 03 
.Accon.n 1 Humber 
00038 
Cash!!, 
Number of checks 
rot aJ .De1ios.i tea · 
LesscasJi 
t\lJ:! DePos,j t t11110ID! 1 






- $() .oo 
$800 .. 00 
09 : 44AN 05125/05 Credited: 051251(l5 
0 
~ll$ Farso Bank · 
Transacticn Record 
STORE ll 04055 06 
,~ . 
Acco'Unt Number \, I \ 
nnmo Y'·; ~ ; . ,, 
~ Cash Jn 
1otal Deposlted 
Less Ca.sh 
Net OeJi<isl t AmOunt 
\ 
' I 








Ol•45Pl'I 041161(15 Credited: 04118105 
Tha.ni: ~u, SanJuanita 
Jkl ls Far~ Bank 
Trans.llction RecQrd 




Number of ctieel{s 
1ohl i)QJ)Ostt2<1 . 
Less casn 











iransact1011 .« OS2 0035 








Yells Farso Bank 
Transaction ~ord 




Number of cnec~ 
Total ~osi ted 
Less cash 
Net Oe.Poslt A:eount 








03•59Pl1 QS/19105 Creditedt 08/lS/05 
1.Jel ls Far:m Bank 
Transacti9n ~c:ord 





Total OePosited :1/; 
Less tash 
Net llePosit fl!rlOunt 








W30Al1 01m1os credited: 0112s1os 
Thank YOU, Sarah 
Yel Is Far-so Bank 
Transaction Rec.or.d 




HUIJ)ber 01 checks 
rotaJ Df!Pi>Si ted 
Less casti 
Net DePo.s1t Allloun t 










04 :~JPtf 05i24/D5 Credl fed; OS/24105 







_ JJe'..1 ls .f ';lrso _Sank. 
irsmsacuon 1<econ:1 · 




Hl.lllber of Che.Cks 
Total DePos.i te4'· 
Les.s.~--
Net D9:POS.it- Alilo.Uilt 
~· .. 1100.0~ 
-$100.00. 
·.:. .$(1.00 
$1-00. .. 00 
Transa~tion; G39 0044 
10:27AM ll114/05·Credited: JUW95 
Thank YOU, Jennifer 
Wel0>,ie to Bank of At1erica 
. ·Banlc with the people you have eo11e 
to knou and depend on •. 
TOTAL DEPOSITED to 
Checldng#-
Bank of Afterica 
Arizona 
Ref I 27410S24J tsoo.oo 





_Yei is t~rso_Bank . 
Transaction Rerord 




Number of c:hecks 
fotaJ ilaPP.SH.ed 
Less Cash 
~t Df.i>o5lt Ammmt 





_,: .• iO,QQ. 
$800 .. 00 









~!~l,7,:, .. ,:; 1,·;l Bank ,:1-i A .. .:.1•• r-
• ,·i1o. ,,.~C"s 
(,' ·: ·· rt;;~ • .- 1.:ii· t~:.11,? ...... ,I,,\~ 
· - .{:.,.1 i.1ti.; .:-....... ~ .. ~r,., 
TOTAL DEPOS T,: 
Checking 
Bank of l'ler i:i 
Arizona 











. . ,: .· 
. ... .. . . ~·. 
.- 'rr.te.t \s f&rso· Bank ... 
:ransac;tlon Record 





· · · ·. ·. 11160 :oi . 
.Number 0£ che.cJ(:. . · · o· 
Total 'lle:Po5itE:ll . • • - .Oil 
~-Qsli. ,,·, ... . -..$1).0Q. 
~1 ~ii·.~t ~:WJ·. 
Ira11saction 11 027 0033 . 






· iJe.11s Far so Bank 
Transactloo·Record 
STORE: a 05994 OJ 
Account' N'Wllber 
QD038 
Cash 111. • 
.K\tH~ o,f. creeks 
Tota..l Oeliosi 1e4 
,1.es.s,Cash 








'tra11sat1jGm # ~ 0343 






WelcoNe to Dank of AMrica 
Bank with ihe people you have co"e 







TOTAL DEPOS .. ITED to 
Checking II 
Bank of A"er ca. 
Arizona . 
Ref l 274106024 






Ye 11 s Far so Bank 
·Transaction Record 
STORE U 059134 01 
ACCOlll) 1 Number 
ilODJB . . 
·casn ln 
Nllll!ber 01 cneclls 
TolaJ D~l te.d 
Less Ca$h· 
·Net llePOS! 1 ..All'ilruM' . 




.$.3',!\DI} .00 . 
~ $0,0J) 
$3,500.0'0 







---- ·····--·····"· . 
INSTRUMENT NO. c}-d07'!£/ 3&t 7 
QlJlTCLAJM DEED 
FOR V ALUB RECEIVED: Thirty Five Thousand dollars ($35,000.00) 
. JUANM CUEVAS AND YRENE BAEZ . . 
Whose address is: 5019 WEDGE MONT A VE PHOENIX, AZ 85035 
Hotelnafter called the first party, do hc{Cby convey, release, remise and forever 
QUITCLAIM unto second party: Wll,l'RIDO CUEV AB 
The following described premises to-wit: 
Parcelno.06n0Sw198800 
196N·SWSB 
TAX 2-B lN SWSB. 
SIS tr. ,A-rt"A C. HHD 
Dated: 06/13/2007 







IN WITNESS WHBRBOF, Tho said fust party has signed and sealed these ineseD18 the· 
day IU;ld year fim above Vfrltten. . 
SfJlte ofiPAHO ) 
:ss 
County·of Canyon) 
On this 131h day of June, 2007 before me, Jesus Lobo, a Notaiy Publlo in and for the 
State ofldaho., personally appemed. Juao M Cuevas and Yrcne Baez known to me to be the 
persons whoso names are subscribed to the within Instrument and aoknowledged to mo that they 
oxewted the same. · 






















A part of the Southwest¾ of the Scuthe-ist %, section 
19,. Townshi.p 6 .North, .Range 5 Wesf:!'Of the °Oise Mer1di.an, 
more p~rticularly descri1'ed to-f.f~t: 
Commencing at the Soµt:hwest corner of the Southwest ~·of 
the soutt.ea.s~ ¾, Sect.i.on 19, ta"'nship 6 North, kange 5 
.:est of the Boise .Meridian, the :tnii:ia1 .Point of this des-
cription; thence .North 0•07' East 924 feet, along the · 
111est line o:f· the Said Southwest lfo~the South-east¼) thence 
South 55°15 • sast 336.82 f'eet; thence South 0•07• .-;est 
730 feet, paral.lel 1 to the .said west: l:l.ne to a;,point on 
the Sout.1:1 line of the iaid Southwest ~of t."le Soutb·east 't; 
thence South 89°35' ,iest ~77.lS feet, along t:he said S01Jth 
line to the initicl ?oint of t.~is descripilen. 
• I 
.. 









'r'f-1:~lrallbil +wtln•llu 1t•MI, to 11•rt10t 11• /d hr 
• -·- ~t\.... &..•.1.na~. , • . • , ,-,.1,w,,, ul/N 
. . . • ~ • ..,,.,,,,, all a1fd aonn7 vtdo /IN ,-.,,/Id '""'• ,.,.., fiant••• IN/u, ,ucnuorr .,,,, 
l>IW,1 lf~ll. w/'lir '"1 ,_nt,. lrll..tll-nll .,..,, ~Jklfltnenna IMIIUIIIO belan,lftl 0, 1/J• 
- llltalwl,,. °"' Coun,, ol. - ~nyon __ . . -· .,., s, ••• o1i1w11, lh1u/'11d •• loJlowl. ro-wi,: 
~ s;art af th! SovtllWu, (llurtu of the Soutlleut Quarter, Met Ion ;~, Township 6 llortb, 
bnA• 8' Weit, Boin Mlrldl111, C1nyo11 County, ld1lro, 110r1 ptrUGuhny ducrlb1d lo-wit: 
t10Me11e;l119 1t the SQuttiltest Comer of tlte Southwnt Qvarter of the Southeut Qutrl,r, ~-Off 19, TOWn5hlJ1 6 Noru, R11191 5 We1l, Boin ltll'ldhn; th, INltlAL POINT of tflh 
d•1Crlpt1&n; tflenn 
Hnttfr 0· de9~u 07' East 924 fHl, along th• Wut line of lhe uid Southwr5t Quarter 
qf. the Southeast Qutl"tn; thence 
Sout.h 55 d1grn1 15' Ent 336.82 ,fee; than-ca 
!Joufll 0 d~..-.u 07' llest 730 fnt, p,a1'1llel to the utd West lln1, to• point on the 
South 1 h11t of the u Id Soutllwut Qu1rter of tbe 5out.htut Quarter; th1111u 
.South 8-9. deg~es 35' West 271, 1S feet, along the uld South line to the llllTr.td. POT!f:I' 
Of iHJS 0li5Cll1PTIOII. 
. 
<.O w 










.......... ~:.::~· .......... .. .. .... ················:·;;~-~--··· .. ··· it 
· i 
By .......... .................. .......... ............ Depu1r 
000434 WC0058 
"' 1 ' 
( 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMliNT 
Whicte Servleff. Tdfes • P.O. Box 7129 
Boise ID 83707-1129 
· AP.PLICANT COPY 
(208) 384-8683 
dMv.kfaho.gov 
111>-J»9 ,~,... -f-ot) APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF TITLE 
I; the undenigned, certify tbat the vehicle/venel described below L, owned by me, and this vehide/ve.uel wilJ not be the nbject of 
Hen prior to receipt of the title unlesr indicated below. I further certify under penalty of law that all information contained herein 
L, true and correct to the beJt of my knowledge and belief (I.C. 49-518). I hereby make application for a certificate of title for raid 
vehicle/vcnel, and authorize the new title to be inued in the namc(s) shown in section 2. If I am applying for a duplicate title, It is 
because the original ha, been lost unles, otherwise Indicated: 
1 1 
D ll(tgible D Mutilated. (Plwc Attach). 
The signature below is my true and legal signature. 
X K Daytime Phone# -------
'rHIS IS NOT A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE Receipt: 07BA002731 
Type of Application 
'l'RANSJ!'ER -- REGULAR 'l'I'l'LE 
Vehicle / Hull Identification Number 
z 
-~ ~~WUR: V,h:::--N:::, 
z a 1972 BROD HOUSE TRA'ILER TL 
F, IQ Ducriptlon Color Top / Bottom Fud Type 
~ MBL BM BRO/YEL 
Weight Length Width Hull Horsepower Propulsion 
~ ~=.:: .. Odometer Status Odometer Reading Date 
I I ~ 0000000 
Prcvlow Previow State Br.and Previous Sbtc 1itlc Number 
Sbte 
Purcha!U - Owner Ntme and Addren 
CUEVAS, WILll'lUDO 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660-0000 
Primary Lien Holder 
NON& 













2007 06 20 
Dealer Number Seller's Permit Number 
60037S 
Tax Exemption 
MANUFAC'l' HOME 'l'O PVT 
Trade 
In 
GROSS SALES PRICE 
'l'RADE-IN ALLOWANCE 





CANYON COUN'l'Y ASSESSOR 
06/20/07 
'l'I'l'LI: ISSUE FEB 






















THE ATTACHED ID.?i.116 ci,hFICATE OF TITLE, rs THE 
DOCUMEN'r FOR YOUR VEHICLE OR VESSEL. DO NOT CA~.RY :!:1' IN YOUH 
VEHICLE OR VESSEL. KEEP. IT J:N A SECOil.l~ PX,ACE. Ul?ON SALE OR 
TFJ-u\JSFER Or.' 1:!·IID V1?:HT.CLE OR VES$EL, THg 't-.lEW -Y.1NER MUST APPLY 
FOR TI'l'LE WITTfftf 30. DAYS TO AVOID A $2.0, 00· P;F:NA.LTY.. 
1 CUEVAS, WIL~"RIDO 1 7 
29452 PEARL RD 
PARMA ID 83660 
\ 
_j 
• 1)i:ITACH lt(Rf. ji'BA002731 DVSC1182 .. ,· · .... :_. ..  ·... . . . ... :. ·-
.. 
]825 • 
NOTICE OF RELEASE OF LIABILITY $2.00 Fee 
/ 
PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY - ALL INFORMATION MUST BE COMPLETE - . NOTIFICATIO_N BY SELLER/TRANS.FEROR IS MANDATORY [ 
1972Yov BROD H~ody~lt C53 1 "r' 
Seller'.tllninsferor's Full Name: ___________________ D•,ytimc Phone Number: ______ _ 
Addren: City:--------------- si,te: __ Zip: ______ _ 
Odometer:_._··~------'-·__,_ _Selling Price:$____ Dote Delivered to Purchaserrrrnns!cree: ----~..-----:--
Purchaser's/Tran.tfere_e's Full Name:~-_________________ _ 
L:.A::d::dr::es::s·:..:· ================:..:C:::lty'..:.:::::t:._-=== ....... - State: __ Zip:--~----
I/we hcRby ~ueat 1h1t lh• ld1ho Tnnapar1a1ion Dep1rtmc,11 muk Ile ricord110 Indicate Lh1c lhe whicle or vcssol dN-Clibed 1boYe hu,,: ~,, uansfomd. However. Uwa undcmand lh11 Iha tille recotd 
- · will n1mdn in my/our name(a) unlll~new Idaho Ccttlftcu11 ofl'.llle la applied for ind lalucd. l'CQQrdlnt. ~he 111.1nc(1) ol lhe acw owne{(a). 
X____ .Slrna11tr,ofS1/l•,ts)li'iriii,itro,t1/o O O 4-3.-..6 ___ .----




HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
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A.M. ___ P.M. 
SEP 1 6 2010 
C/~NYON COUt.ffY CLERK 
J HE!DEMA'~, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPER TY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 





Case No. CV09-8175 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, by and through his attorney of 
record, Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and hereby objects to the Affidavit 
of Wilfrido Cuevas filed herein and moves the Court to strike and not consider as evidence 




in deciding Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment any reference by Plaintiff, 
Wilfrido Cuevas, to an oral agreement between Plaintiff and Juan Manuel Cuevas. 
It is well known in the State ofldaho that Idaho Code§ 9-503, also known as the 
Statute of Frauds, provides that no interest in real property can be created by an oral 
agreement. 
The parole evidence rule prohibits Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, from presenting any 
evidence of an alleged oral contract in this present case. The exception of partial 
performance is based upon the equitable remedy of specific performance and can only be 
used in disputes between the parties to the oral contract. McGinness v. Stanfield, 6 Idaho 
3 72, 55 P. 1020 (1898). Since Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, was not a party to the 
alleged oral agreement between Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, and Juan Manuel Cuevas, the 
alleged oral agreement is not admissible as evidence in the present case. 
This Motion is based on the files and records contained herein. 
DATED this _Li_ day of September, 2010. 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 
000438 
( 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the 15 day of September, 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of Objection and Motion to Strike by the method indicated 
below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX 829 
BOISE, ID 83701 
FAX: (208) 385-5384 
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477 
Rebecca A. Rainey1 ISB No. 7525 
MOFPATI, THOMAS, BARRSTT1 ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 34S-2000 




Attomeys for Plaintiffi'Counterdefendant 
CANYON COUNTY 
J HEtDEMAN, oeiu~K 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, m AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEV AS 1 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X1 UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXHffiIT "A"1 COMMONLY KNOVv'N AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAH01 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 





Case No. CV09-8175 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE~ 1 Cllent1780612,1 
000440 
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COMES NOW PlaintiffWilfrido Cuevas, by and through undersigned counsel of 
record, and hereby files this opposition to defendant Bernardino Barraza's objection and motion 
to strike the Affidavit of Wilfiido Cuevas, filed on or about September 21, 2009, and expressly 
relied upon in support of Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
At the time the Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas was originally filed, defendant filed 
a nearly identical motion to strike such affidavits for the same reasons set forth herein. Plaintiff 
Wilfrido Cuevas responded to such motion to strike by Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant 
Barraza's Objection and Motion to Strike, filed on October 27, 2009 (the "Opposition'1). In 
response to defendant's renewed motion to strike, Plaintiff hereby incorporates the Opposition, 
in its entirety, as though the same were set forth herein. 
This Court heard oral argument on the motion ta strike on November 3, 2009, and 
by order dated November 9, 2009 and entered November 10, 2009, denied defendant's motion to 
strike. As this Court has already once ordered that the facts set forth in the Affidavit of Wilfrida 
Cuevas are properly considered by this Court in the present matter, Wilfrido Cuevas respectfully 
requests that this Court again deny defendant's motion to strike such affidavit. 
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2010. 
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By ·-;Z-e___ #I I 
Rebecca A. Rainey- Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter 
PLAINTIFF,$ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of September, 2010, I ca.used a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
BARRAZA 1S OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587~3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bemardino Ba"aza 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
:z 2.-< a rz3=-
Rebecca A. Rainey . 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S 
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477 
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTBRBD 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 




Attorneys for Plaintifti'Counterdefendant 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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EXHIBIT .. A", COMMONLY KNOV/N AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PAR.MA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The present motion involves a very simple question: whether Wilfrido has valid 
legal title to the Property. Once Wilfrido affirmatively establishes that fact, Barraza has the 
burden of proving (i) that he had a prior valid interest in the Property, and {ii) that Wilfrido knew 
of such interest before he took title to the Property. Unless there is a genuine issue of material 
fact on both of these issues, sum.mary judgment quieting title in Wilfrido's name is appropriate. 
In the opening memorandum supporting Wilfrido's second motion for summary 
judgment, Wilfrido presented evidence conclusively establishing that he holds valid legal title to 
the Property by virtue the Quitclaim Deed. Barraza has failed to present any evidence creating a 
geimine issue of material fact regarding the validity of such Quitclaim Deed. 
Likewise, in the opening memorandum. Wilfiido demonstrated that there is no 
evidence establishing that Barraza has a prior valid interest in Property. At that point. it became 
() Barraza's burden to come forward with either evidence tending to shaw that he did1 indeed, have 
a prior valid claim to the property. Barraza did not meet this burden and. instead, simply 
provided this Court with a catalogue of alleged disputed that facts spoke only to whether 
Wilfrido had knowledge ofBarraza's invalid and unenforceable claims to the Property. As noted 
in the opening memorandum, because Barraza1s claims to the Property were invalid, 
unenforceable, and not legally recognizable. even if this court assumes that Wilftido did have 
knowledge of the same, such facts are immaterial and do not defeat the present motion for 
summary judgment. Accordingly. summary judgment quieting title in Wilftido's name is 
appropriate. 
As a secondary issue, in his opening memorandum. Wilfrido conclusively 
demonstrated that Barraza had failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment. In Barraza's 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WILFRlDO CUEVAS' 
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opposition, he proved this to be true and further established that he had no evidence to support 
any of the elements of an unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, entry of summary judgment 
ordering that Barraza talce nothing by his counterclaim for unjust enrichment is appropriate. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Barraza Failed to Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Regarding the 
Validity of the Quitclaim Deed. 
The Memorandum in Support ofWilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment establishes that the Quitclaim Deed executed by Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez in favor 
ofWilfrido is a valid instrument conveying legal title to Wilfrido pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
55-601. Barraza's opposition does not even address, much less attempt to challenge, the validity 
of the Quitclaim Deed. Rather, Barraza challenges only the enforceability of the fully 
I!,erformed purchase and sale agreement that resulted in the Quitclaim Deed based on a statute of 
frauds defense. 
It is well~settled under Idaho law that, where an agreement is fully performed, the 
statute of frauds does not apply. Willis v. Willis, 33 Idaho 353, 358, 194 P. 470,472 (1920). 
Execution of the Quitclaim Deed, in and of itself, creates a valid conveyance ofland and such 
deed is valid notwithstanding the terms, conditions, and/or performance1 of the underlying 
agreement. See Idaho Code Section 55"601. Accordingly, Barraza,s attempted statute of frauds 
defense is misplaced and facts supporting the same are irrelevant. Because Wilfrido holds title 
1 Barraza attempts to raise an issue of fact regarding whether Wilfrido paid the full stated 
consideration for the Property. However, like the allegations concerning Wilfi.ido's knowledge 
ofBarraza,s invalid and unenforceable claims, this fact has no bearing on the validity of the 
deed. Indeed, as a matter of law, inadequacy of consideration (which is only relevant in a fraud 
case) is not alone a sufficient basis to have a deed set aside. McLeod v. Lewis-Clark Hotel Co., 
66 Idaho 584,591, 164 P.2d 195 (1945); see also Idaho Code§§ 55-901, S5-912. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO CUEVAS' 
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c· by virtue of a valid, duly recorded quitclaim deed, Wilfrido is the presumptive legal owner of the 
Property. Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 2641 270, 127 P.3d 167, 173 (2005). 
B. Wilfrido's Status as a Bona Fide Purchaser is Irrelevant Unless Barraza 
Establishes a Prior Valid Claim, 
Because Wilfrido is the presumptive legal owner of the Property, Barraza bears 
the burden of defeating this presumption by proving, first, that he has a prior valid interest in the 
Property and, second, that Wilftido had knowledge ofBarraza's prior valid interest. Because 
Barraza has not presented any evidence that he had a prior valid interest, the absence of proof on 
that issue is dispositive and Wilfrido's status as a bona fide purchaser is irrelevant and 
immaterial. 
1. There is no evidence in the record Indicating that Wilfrido bas a 
legally recognizable interest in the Property. 
Though Barraza bears the burden of establishing that he has a prior valid interest 
() in the Property, in order to fully brief the issue in the opening memorandum, Wilfrido addressed 
the three possible documents that might support Barraza's alleged interest in the property: the 
Claim of Lien, the Spanish Document, and the English Document.2 In response, :Barraza did not 
rely on D!U'. of these three documents to support his alleged interest, nor did he respond with any 
other evidence giving him a legally recognizable interest in the Property. 
C 
With respect to the Claim of Lien, Barraza failed to present any argument that 
such Claim of Lien created a legally recognizable interest in the Property, apparently conceding 
the fact that such Claim of Lien was an unauthorized or nonconsensual common law lien. 
2 Although Wilfrido anticipated that Barraza might rely on the Spanish and English 
documents and therefors attached them to an affidavit for the Court to reference, neither Wilfrido 
nor counsel has the requisite personal knowledge to lay a foundation for and/or authenticate 
these documents. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO CUEVAS' 






Sep-23-2010 02:18 PM Moff 
, , I Thomas 2083855384 
In his opposition brief, Barraza did rely on a statement in his affidavit that there 
was a contract, but fails to produce a copy of such contract that is admissible into evidence/ and 
further fails to establish that any such contract created a prior valid interest in the Property. 
Rather, Barraza relies solely upon the decision from the Idaho Court of Appeals on his appeal to 
set aside default entered in the underlying matter between Barraza and Wilfiido's predecessor in 
interest, Juan Cuevas. Barraza 's reliance on such decision is insufficient to withstand the present 
motion for summary judgment. 
The Court of Appeal's decision in Cuevas v. Barraza involved Barraza's appeal 
of the district court's order denying Barraza's motion to set aside default. 146 ldaho St 1, 518, 
198 P.3d 740, 747 (Ct. App. 2008). The precise issue before the Idaho Court of Appeals was 
whether Barraza had sufficiently pled a meritorious defense to warrant the setting aside of 
default. Id. Because only the pleading stage was at issue, the court specifically noted that "[t]he 
meritorious defense requirement is a pleading requirement, not a burden of proof' and, further, 
that "Barraza was not required to submit the written contract into evidence" in order to state a 
claim. Id. Looking no further than the pleadings, the court concluded only that Barraza had 
stated a claim. Id. Contrary to Barraza's representation in his opposition memorandum, the 
court did 11ot find that Barraza actually bad a contract giving him a legally recognizable interest, 
nor did the court find that the contract survived a statute of frauds defense. Id. 
3 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that copies of documents attached to an 
affidavit should be referred to and also either sworn to or certified. As noted by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals, documents must be identified and authenticated and an adequate foundation must be 
laid for the documents to be admissible into evidence. Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 141 
Idaho 477, 483, 111 P.3d 162, 168 (Ct. App. 2005); see also Idaho R. Evidence 901. Here, 
Barraza failed to swear to, refer to, identify or otherwise authenticate any of the documents 
attached to the affidavit. Therefore, Barraza failed to establish that any of the documents 
attached to the affidavit constitute the alleged written contract. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OFWILFRIDO CUEVAS' 
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In the present motion, we have moved beyond the pleading stage and, unlike the 
issues before the Court of Appeals, this Court must decide the sufficiency of the evidence. At 
this stage in the litigation, the burden is on Barraza to come forward with actual evidence to 
support his claims that he has a prior valid jnterest in the property. Despite this burden, Barraza 
has failed to present any evidence of the alleged contract and failed to demonstrate through legal 
argument how any such alleged contract satisfies the statute of frauds and creates a valid 
property interest As a result, Barraza has failed to meet his burden of proof and has not 
established a genuine issue of material fact tending to show that he has a prior valid interest in 
the Property. Accordingly, summary judgment quieting title in Wilfrido's name is proper. 
2. Without evidence that Barraza has an interest ln the Property, 
Wilfrldo's status as a good faith or bonaflds purchaser ts irrelevant 
Because Wilfrido has established that he holds legal title to the Property by way 
of a valid quitclaim deed and because Barraza has failed to prese11t any evidence establishing that 
he has a prior and valid interest in the Property. whether Wilfrido is a good faith or bona fide 
purchaser is irrelevant in determining whether he holds legal title. 
If person challenging a record title holder's claim to title cannot establish any 
actual prior claim or interest, then the bona fide or good faith purchaser analysis is simply 
inapplicable. See Estate of Skvorakv. Security Union. 140 Idaho 16, 21-22, 89 P.3d 856i 861-62 
(2004) (holding that the good faith purchaser analysis does not apply to the initial 
encumbrancer). A purchaser's knowledge of a prior claim does not affect the validity of the 
purchaser's status if the person claiming a prior interest does not actually have a right in the 
property, Sun Va/fay Hot Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 6571 66 l, 962 P ,2d 1041, 1045 
( 1998). In other words. there must actually be "outstanding adverse rights of anothert' for there 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO CUEVAS' 
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to be an analysis of whether a purchaser was on notice of adverse rights. See Adams v. 
Anderson, 142 Idaho 208,213.127 P.3d 111, 116 (200S) (defining a bcmaflde purchaser as one 
who has "notice of any outstanding adverse rights of anothern); Ross v. Rosen-Rager, No. 
1080721 (Ala. 8-27-2010) (holding that the status of the purchaser as 11bonafide" is irrelevant 
where the person claiming against the purchaser has no claim in the property), TI1e case of 
Lcmgroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218,526 P.2d 178 (1974) is distinguishable because in that matter 
the plaintiff had a legally recognizable right to refonnation of the deed and the facts present in 
the case gave the adverse claimant inquiry notice of that legally recognizable right, Absent 
evidence demonstrating that Barraza has a legally recognizable interest in the Property, any 
disputed issues of fact regarding Wilfrido•s status as a bona fide purchaser are immaterial and 
irrelevant and cannot preclude summary judgment. 
c. Barraza Has No Claim for Unjust Enrichment. 
In order to survive the present motion for summary judgment on his counterclaim 
for unjust enrichment, Barraza has to put on specific evidence showing that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact on each and every one of the unjust enrichment elements: (i) that he 
conferred a benefit on Wilfrido; (ii) that Wilfrido appreciated the benefit, and (iii) that it would 
be inequitable for Wilfiido to accept the benefit without payment of such benefit, and (iv) the 
value of the benefit bestowed on the Wilfrido. Teton Peaks Investment Co., LLC v. Ohms, 14G 
Idaho 349, 3971 195 P.3d 12071 1210 (2008); Holladay v. Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 770, 152 P.3d 
638, 641 (App. 2006 (citing Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 ldaho 663,666,619 P.2d 11 lG, 
1119 (1980))). Additionally, with respect to alleged benefits such as "improvements to the 
property," Barraza must establish that Wilm.do was the intended beneficiary of the benefit 
Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467,471, 886 P.2d 772, 776 (1994), 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO CUEVAS' 
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Barraza has not submitted evidence creating a genuine issue of fact regarding any 
of these elements. Rather, BtuTaza defends the motion for summary judgment on his 
counterclaim for just enrichment by making legally and factually unsupported allegations. None 
of these unsubstantiated assertions even claim that that Barraza conveyed a benefit on Wilfrido 
or that Barraza intended Wilfrido to be a beneficiary of any benefit. Rather, they show that Juan 
Cuevas conferred a benefit on Wilfrido by virtue of the quitclaim deed, Barraza conferred a 
benefit on Juan Cuevas by virtue of payment of the alleged purchase price, and that Barraza 
conferred a benefit on the Property and himself by virtue of improvements made to the Property. 
Notwithstanding the fact that each and every one of these allegations should be disregarded 
because they are not supported by any evidenceJ even if they were supported by evidence, they 
could not save Barraza's unjust enrichment claim because the do not show a benefit flowing 
directly from Battaza to Wilfrido. 
Because Barraza's allegations lack any evidentiary support and do not otherwise 
support a claim for unjust enrichment, Bamza has failed to meet his burden of establishing a 
prima facie case for unjust enrichment. Accordingly, it is appropriate for this Court to grant 
Wilfrido's motion for summary judgment on this issue, ordering that Barraza take nothing by his 
unjust enrichment counterclaim claim. 
III. CONCLUSION 
AB the foregoing demonstrates, Barraza has failed to raise any disputed issues of 
fact that would preclude summary judgment. There is no evidence to dispute the validity of 
Wilfrido Cuevas•s Quitclaim Deed,. there is no evidence establishing that Barraza had any legally 
recognizable interest in the Property, and there is no evidence supporting Barraza,s unjust 
enrichment counterclaim. Accordingly, Wilfrldo respectfully requests this Court to grant the 
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present motion for summary judgment and quiet title to the Property in the name ofWilfrido 
Cuevas and dismiss Barraza's unjust enrichment claim. 
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BAR.RE1T, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTBRED 
BY-1-=--==::;;...;.;...L-'--~---
Rebecca A. Rainey - Of th F' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Coun efendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of September. 2010. l caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO 
CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following; 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendanr Bernardino Barrata 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, by and through his attorney of record, 
Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and submits this supplemental memorandum 
pursuant to the Court's decision on October 14, 2010, to continue this matter for thirty (30) days 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFF()ijij~ION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I 
C 
before entering a decision on Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment alleged Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, is 
entitled to summary judgment per Idaho Code§ 55-606 and Idaho Code§ 55-812 known as the 
recording statutes. Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, disputed that Plaintiff is entitled to summary 
judgment per the recording statute. 
Specific Performance 
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, as the moving party has the burden of proving that he is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff has not proven this. Plaintiffs motion did not 
allege that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, does not have a claim for specific performance. 
Thus, Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, did not need to dispute an allegation that was not made, 
and affirmatively state in his response to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has a claim for specific performance. 
However, in the event the court considers Plaintiffs Second Motion For Summary judgment to 
allege Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, does not have a claim for specific performance Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza, hereby affirmatively states he has a claim for specific performance of his 
written contract to purchase the real property in question, which, if granted, would result in 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, receiving quiet title to the property. 
It is undisputed that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has a written contract to purchase the 
real property from Plaintiff's predecessor in title. Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has not only 
partially performed his written contract to purchase the real property, he has fully performed. 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, paid $22,635.00 to Juan Manuel Cuevas pursuant to his written 
contract to purchase. (Second Rainey Affidavit, Exhibit 2, Barraza's Response to Production 
number 2) Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has paid in full the balance of his purchase price to 
000454 
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Juan Manuel Cuevas with the $68,000.00 of foregone rent given to Juan Manuel Cuevas in the 
amount of $800.00 per month from August 2003 to the present. All facts must be construed in 
favor of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, as the non moving party. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, 
never disputed Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, paid Juan Manuel Cuevas and even ifhe did 
dispute payment, then it would be an issue for trial. 
Statute of Frauds 
It is undisputed that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, had a written contract to purchase 
the property. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, contract does not satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds. The contract does not need to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Idaho Code § 
9-504 provides that Specific Performance is an exception to the Statute of Frauds. Thus the 
Statute of Frauds is not a bar to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, right to specific performance 
of his written contract to purchase the property. 
Idaho Code § 9-503 is codified as the Statute of Frauds, and provides that the creation of 
an interest in real property must be in writing. Idaho Code § 9-504 is codified as the Exceptions 
to the Statute of Frauds and provides as follows: 
9-504. Exceptions to preceding section. -- The preceding section must not be 
construed to ... abridge the power of any court to compel the specific performance of an 
agreement, in case of part performance thereof. 
Thus the Statute of Frauds does not apply to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, claim for specific 
performance of his written contract to purchase the property. The court in Roundy v Waner, 98 
Idaho 625 (1977), held that part performance took the transaction out of the Statute of Frauds and 
justified the trial court's decision to quiet title in the daughter and her husband. 
Even if specific performance was not a statutory exception to the Statute of Frauds, the 
street address is a sufficient legal description for Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, written 
000455 
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contract to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. In Russell v Russell, 99 Idaho 151 (1978) the name of 
the owner and the street address of the property was a sufficient legal description. In Garner v 
Bartschi, 13 9 Idaho 43 0 (2003) the court cited various other cases and noted that parole evidence 
may be resorted to for the purpose of identifying the description contained in the writing with its 
location upon the ground. In Haney v Malka, 123 Idaho 132 (Ct App 1992) the court held that 
tax parcel numbers were a sufficient description since they permitted persons to identify the 
property being conveyed by reference to records in the County Assessor's Office. 
Unjust Enrichment 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, improved the property by adding a patio, sprinkler 
system, and grass for the yard. Further, he cleaned and made numerous repairs to the property, as 
well as reinstated the ditch rights. (Second Rainey Affidavit, Exhibit 2, Barraza's Response to 
Interrogatory number 6) There was no allegation Bernardino Barraza did not improve the 
property. It was simply alleged that his improvements were not a benefit to Plaintiff, Wilfrido 
Cuevas. Defendant, Bernardino Barraza' s, improvements to the property are a benefit to 
whoever receives .the property, including Wilfrido Cuevas. Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, also 
paid down Wilfrido Cuevas' alleged $80,000 purchase price of the property so that Plaintiff, 
Wilfrido Cuevas, only allegedly paid a total of $35,000.00 for Juan Manuel Cuevas' remaining 
interest as noted on the quitclaim deed. 
DATED this "J-- day ofNovember, 2010. 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the _2J_ day of November, 2010, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of Supplemental Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment by the method indicated below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX 829 
BOISE, ID 83701 
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101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
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BERNARDINO BARRAZ~ an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIO BALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
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COMES NOW Wilfrido Cuevas ("Cuevas"), by and through undersigned counsel 
of record, and hereby files this response to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum Opposing 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment:1 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant's New Part Pet·formance Argument Provides No Basis to Changes 
This Court's Ordet· Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff. 
1. Defendant should have raised the pa11 performance exception to the 
statute of frauds in his opposition to Cuevas' motion for summary 
judgment. 
In the Supplemental Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment CUSupplemental Memorandum"), Defendant argLtes that summary judgment 
was not proper because Cuevas failed to alleged that Defendant did not have a claim for specific 
performance, which Defendant accurately identifies as an exception to the statute of frauds. 
Supplemental Memorandum at 2-3. However, the party alleging part performance/specific 
perfonnance exception to the statute of frauds bears the burden of proof and must prove such 
claim by clear and convincing evidence, Bear Island Weiter Ass '11, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 
722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994) (citing Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551,558,381 P.2d 802, 805 
(1963)). 
1 It was Cuevas' understanding that this Com1 agreed to a 30~day continuance prior to 
entering the order granting summary judgment to allow Defendant the opportunity to file a 
motion for reconsideration of this Court's order on Plaintiff's Second Motion for Sun1mary 
Judgment, as such mling was made from the bench on October 14, 2010. In order to bring this 
matter to timely completion, Cuevas respectfully requests that this Court not allow additional 
time, beyond the 30-day time frame set f011h in this Court's comments from the bench on 
October 14, 2010, before entering the order on Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and, if 
appropriate, the final judgment reflecting the same. With the entry of such order and judgment, 
the pa11ies will still have the time provided under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to proceed 
with motions for reconsideration and/or an appeal of this Court's decision, as necessary. 
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Under Idaho's rules of civil procedure "where a non-moving party bears the 
burden of proof on an issue at trial, the moving paity is not required to negate the nonmoving 
party's claim" in order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. See Chandler v. Hayden, 
147 Idaho 765,771,215 P.3d 485,491 (2009) (relying on Celote..r: Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 323 ( 1986) (finding "no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party 
suppo1t its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponenl's claim") 
(emphasis in original)). Because Defendant bears the burden of proof on the issue of part 
pe1fonmmce/specific performance, even though he is the non-moving party, he is required to 
raise the issue in defending the motion for summary judgment and set forth evidence 
demonstrating that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding this exception LO the statute 
of frauds that preclude summary judgment. Defendant failed to raise these defenses and/or 
exceptions to the statute of frauds issue and the summary judgment ordered by this Court was 
proper. 
2. Defendant has not submitted any evidence supporting his part 
performance argument. 
Even if Defendant had properly raised the issue, there is no admissible evidence 
in the record of facts that would suppo11 part perfonnance as an exception to the statute of frauds. 
To withstand summaiy judgment, the nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial." Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Age11cy. I11c., 126 Idaho 527, 530~3 l, 887 
P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that "an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this mle, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." While Defendant has alleged, on several occasions 
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including the complaint. Defendant's Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintirrs Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Supplemental Memorandum currently before this Court, 
that he has made partial or full payment of the contract price for the purchase of the ranch, there 
is simply no admissible evidence supporting that contention. 
Defendant cites to the Second Rainey Affidavit, Exhibit 2, Barraza's Response to 
Production No. 2 as evidence that Defendant Bernardino Barraza paid $22,635.00 lo Juan 
Manuel Cucvas pursuant to his "written" contract to purchase the ranch. Supplemental 
Men1ora:ndurn at 2. The evidence cited is as follows: 
Reguest for Production No. 2: Please produce copies of any and 
aJl documents evidencing payments made by you to Juan Cuevas 
for the purchase of the property. 
Resognse to Request No. 2: Attached hereto as Exhibit B? are 
copies of the receipts for payments made to Juan Cuevas by 
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, by check or deposited into Juan 
Cuevas' bank account. Defe11dant Bernardino Barraza, does not 
have receipts for some of the cash payments made directly to Juan 
Cuevas. 
Response to Wilfrido Cuevas' First Set oflntcrrogatories and Requests for Production to 
Bemardino Barraza at 5. The referenced "Exhibit B" is a five page document that contains two 
pages of copies of deposit receipts and three pages of copies of checks. First and foremost, all of 
the documents submitted are inadmissible as hearsay and Defendant has made no effort, as 
required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) to submit affidavits of persons with sufficient 
knowledge to establish a valid exception to the hearsay rule. Even if the referenced "'Exhibit B" 
was admissible, there is no evidence in the record showing (i) that the deposits made on the first 
2 The documents attached as Exhibit B to the requests for production are re-submitted 
herewith as Appendix 1 for the Court's convenience. 
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two pages were made by Defendant, or (ii) that the account into which the deposits were made 
was the account of Juan M. Cuevas. 
The copies of checks that comprise the last three pages of the referenced "Exhibit 
B" are, likewise, inadmissible, because they are hearsay and Defendant has failed to satisfy an 
exception to the hearsay rnle that would make these checks admissible. In addition to the 
hearsay problems associated with the checks, they do not evidence any payment made by 
defendant Bernardino Barraza. Rather, each of the 1 I checks bears a signature that appears to 
read "Leo Garza" and all are drawn an the account of"Vista Plumbing Inc." Only Check No. 
1692 bears a note that it is for "pymt on ranch" though no indication is made that the ranch of the 
Property at issue; the remaining checks contain either no indication regarding the purpose of the 
payments or indicate that the payments were for something other than that which Defendant 
alleges. For example, Check Nos. 5175 and 1741 both indicate that they are for "shop rent." 
Check No. 5132 is made out to "Anderson Travel;" Check No. 1707 is made out to "Cash;" 
Check No. 1759 is made out to "Rosario Cuevas;" and Check No. 1763 is made out to ''Leo 
Garza." Simply put, these documents are (i) inadmissible, and (ii) do not, on their face, evidence 
the facts that they were offered to support. Accordingly, there is no admissible evidence in the 
record tending to supp01t Defendant's !ale claim of"part perfomumce" as an exception to the 
statute of frauds. 
B. The St1•eet Address on the Alleged Contract for Sale is Insufficient to Satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds. 
Defendant's argument that the alleged contract satisfies the statute of frauds is not 
supp01ted w1der Idaho law. In order to satisfy the statute of frauds, .. [a] description ofreal 
property must adequately describe the property so that it is possible for someone to identify 
'exactly' what property the seller is conveying to the buyer." Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 
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629, 200 PJd I 174, 1178 (2009). While a court may look to extrinsic evidence to supply an 
adequate description, the extrinsic evidence must be specifically referred to on the face of the 
instrument. Id. The alleged contract does not contain a specific reference to an external record 
that this Court may look to in order to supply the property description. Accordingly, the only 
description provided is the physical address of the Property and the Idaho Supreme Court has 
specifically held that a physical address, standing alone, is simply insufficient: 
The physical address is not a sufficient description of the property 
for purposes of the statute of frauds. It is impossible to determine 
exactly what prope11y [Seller] intended to convey lo [Buyer] 
relying solely on the physical address in the contracl The physical 
address gives no indication of the quantity, identity, or boundaries 
of the real property. 
Id. Significantly, the Frasure court rejected the language of the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Haney !I. Molko, 123 Idaho 132,844 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. l 992), upon which Defendant relies in 
support of his proposition that the street address is sufficient. Because the Idaho Supreme Court, 
as recently as last year, specifically addressed the issue of an adequate legal description and 
again held that the street address is insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, specifically 
rejecting the authoiity upon which Defendant relies, Defendant cannot establish that he has a 
valid and enforceable contract that satisfies the statute of frauds. Accordingly, this Court should 
reject Defendant's argument that the contract was adequate and enter the order granting Cuevas' 
second motion for summary judgment. 
C. Defendant Has Not Introduced Any New or Additional Evidence Supporting 
his Unjust Enrichment Claims. 
Defendant's attempt to salvage his unjust enrichment claim must also fail. It is 
settled under Idaho law that where improvements to real property forn1 the basis for an uajust 
enrichment claim, the claimrult must show that the alleged recipient was the intended benoficiary 
of the improvements. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 471, 886 P.2d 772, 776 (1994). 
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That is lo say, if Defendant made the improvements for his own benefit while he was in 
possession of the prope11y. then such improvements will not support a claim for unjust 
enrichment. Defendant can only maintain a cause of action for m1just enrichment ifhe can show 
that he made the improvements because it was his intent to provide a benefit to Cuevas. There is 
absolutely no evidence in the record regarding (i) when Defendant made the alleged 
improvements, (ii) at whose request and direction lhe alleged improvements were made, and, 
most importantly, (iii) whether Defendant intended to benefit Cuevas at the time he made the 
alleged improvements. Simply pu4 Cuevas has both failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment 
and has failed to present any evidence that would raise a genuine issue of material fact respecting 
the unjust enrichment claim, Accordingly, this Court should enter the order granting summary 
judgment i11 favor of Cuevas and declaring that Defendant take nothing by his unjust enriclunent 
claim. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Cuevas respectfully request that this Court enter the 
order previously made granting Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 9th day of November, 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERBD 
By~a_/' 
Rebecca A. Rainey-Of the E" 
Attorneys for Plaintiff1Counter-w~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of November, 20IO, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIED[,. Y & WA RD 
340 Easl 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defe11dw1l Bernardino Barraza 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(P4.f acsimile 
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HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
D.BUTLER,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV09-8175 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW BER.NARDINO BARRAZA, Defendant herein, by and through his 
attorney of record, Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and pursuant to I.R. C.P. 
Rule 11 ( a)(2) and Rule 56( c) hereby moves the Court to reconsider its Order Granting 
Plaintiffs First Motion for Summary Judgment entered herein on November 10, 2009. 
This motion is supported by the Court file in this matter, and all documents filed 
therein including the Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza previously filed herein, the 
Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment previously 
filed herein, the Affidavit of Robert Ward in Support of Defendant's Answering Brief in 
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Opposition to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment previously filed herein, 
and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Plaintiff's First 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this _i_ day of November, 2010. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the /0 day of November, 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Plaintiffs First 
Motion for Summary Judgment by the method indicated below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX 829 
BOISE, ID 83701 
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HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
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NOV 12 2010 ~ 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
D.BUTLEA,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPER TY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV09-8 l 75 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the defendant, Bernardino Barraza, by and through his attorney ofrecord 
Robert W. Ward of Hall, Friedly & Ward and lodges this memorandum in support of his motion 
to reconsider the order granting Plaintiffs first motion for summary judgment. 
I. FACTS 
The defendant, Bemadino Barraza, hereinafter referred to as Defendant, received quiet 
title to the property that is in dispute in this action, hereinafter referred to as the Ranch, through 
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an order issued by and through the Canyon County District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
Idaho in case number CV 07-3536 on March 16, 2009, hereinafter referred to as the Quiet Title 
Judgment. 
Prior to the action for quiet title being filed that led to Defendant's Quiet Title Judgment, 
Defendant had entered into a valid, written contract to purchase the Ranch on or around March 6, 
2001, from Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez, the then record owners of the Ranch. Juan 
Manual Cuevas and Y rene Baez breached that contract when they instituted the quiet title action 
on April 2, 2007, which led to Defendant's Quiet Title Judgment. 
Plaintiff had actual knowledge of said lawsuit. The lawsuit was actually instituted in an 
attempt by Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez to clear title to the Ranch in order to convey 
clear title of the Ranch to Plaintiff rather than honor the contract that they had entered into to sell 
the property to Defendant. Plaintiff actually discussed with Defendant the desire to purchase the 
property and requested Defendant to give up his interest in the property so that he could purchase 
the Ranch instead of Defendant. On or around June 13, 2007, prior to the completion of their 
quiet title action, Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez executed a quitclaim deed wherein they 
did "convey, release, remise and forever QUITCLAIM" their interest in the Ranch to Plaintiff. 
The quitclaim deed stated that Plaintiff paid $35,000.00 as value for the property. On March 16, 
2009, as stated above, the court entered the Quiet Title Judgment in favor of Defendant. Neither 
of the parties, nor their successors in interest, ever appealed the Quiet Title Action, or filed a 
motion to set aside the Quiet Title Judgment. 
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On August 7, 2009, Plaintiff filed a quiet title action against Defendant in the above-
entitled action. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on or around September 22, 
2009, more than six months after the Quiet Title Judgment was entered. Said motion was 
supported by an Affidavit of Plaintiff, which referenced an oral contract to purchase property, an 
Affidavit of Counsel, and a memorandum in support of the motion. Defendant filed an objection 
to and motion to strike Plaintiffs affidavit because of its reference to an oral contract and other 
inadmissible parole evidence to support Plaintiffs claim. Defendant also filed an affidavit in 
opposition to Plaintiffs summary judgment motion, and a brief in opposition to said motion. 
This court entered its order on November 9, 2009, that declared Defendant's Quiet Title 
Judgment void, and ordered that res judicata did not bar Plaintiffs claim for relief in the above-
entitled action. 
II. ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION 
1. Was the court correct in relying on evidence of an oral contract for the sale of real 
property in making its decision to grant Plaintiffs summary judgment motion? 
2. Was the court correct in adjudicating that Defendant's Quiet Title Judgment was 
void? 
3. Was the court correct in adjudicating that resjudicata did not bar Plaintiffs 
claim? 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. The court should reconsider its order denying Defendant's motion to strike 
Plaintiff's affidavit in support of summary judgment. 
Plaintiff's affidavit should be stricken because Plaintiff inappropriately attempts to admit 
evidence regarding an oral contract for the sale of property and parole evidence supporting the 
same. Idaho courts and statutes have long held that real property can only be conveyed by an 
instrument in writing. In 1898 the Supreme Court ofldaho interpreted LC. § 9-503. In that case 
one of the parties was making a claim on the property based upon an oral transfer that allegedly 
occurred 14 years prior to the date of the deed that conveyed the property to said party. The court 
held that 
Under the statutes [which is the same statute that has existed since 1881 through 
to the present day] we are unable to hold that title to real estate, or an interest in 
real estate, can be established by proof of a verbal transfer. 
McGinness v. Stanfield, 6 Idaho 373,376, 55 P. 1020, 1021 (1898). This case is similar because 
Plaintiff is attempting to claim an interest in the property dating back some time in 2003 to his 
alleged oral contract to purchase the property. Plaintiff received a quitclaim deed to the property 
from Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez in June of 2007 while the property was actively 
involved in litigation. Therefore, Plaintiff's interest in the property can only take effect as of the 
date of the deed and no sooner. 
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B. Plaintiff's interest in the Ranch, as successor to Juan Manuel Cuevas and 
Yrene Baez, is identical to his predecessors and can extend no further. 
Plaintiffs interest in the Ranch was obtained via a quitclaim deed which essentially 
releases or assigns whatever interest the grantor has in the Ranch to Plaintiff, but no more, and 
neither warrants nor professes that the title is valid. The law is well established that 
A grantor can convey nothing more than he or she owns, and ordinarily a grantee 
acquires nothing more than the grantor owns and can convey. See Gardner v. 
Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767,770,450 P.2d 990,993 (1969). A quitclaim deed conveys 
whatever interest the grantors possess at the time of the conveyance. Scogings v. 
Andreason, 91 Idaho 176,180,418 P.2d 273,277 (1966). 
Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264,270, 127 P.3d 167, 173 (2005). The Idaho courts have also 
adopted the definition from Black's Law Dictionary when defining quitclaim deeds. 
A quitclaim deed is a deed of conveyance operating by way of release. BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990). It is intended to pass any title, interest, 
or claim which the grantor may have in the premises. Id. In essence, it is a mode 
of disposing of an asset or an interest in an asset. 
Dunham v. Dunham, 128 Idaho 55, 58,910 P.2d 169, 172 (Ct. App. 1994). Black's Law 
Dictionary, Abridged Seventh Addition defines quitclaim deed as a "deed that conveys a 
grantor's complete interest or claim in certain real property but that neither warrants nor 
professes that the title is valid." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, ABRIDGED 339 (7th ed. 
2000). 
Applying this law to this case, Plaintiff had no more rights or interest in the property than 
his predecessors, Juan and Yrene. To hold otherwise would be to create a law or policy that 
would allow individuals with clouded titles or contested claims to property to increase their 
interests or claim~ merely by executing a quitclaim deed to another individual, regardless of 
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whether that individual has knowledge of the cloud on the title or the contested claim. Therefore, 
in order to understand what Plaintiffs interest in the Ranch truly is, we must look at what 
interest Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez had in the Ranch at the time they quitclaimed the 
property to Plaintiff. 
1. Plaintiff received the property SUBJECT TO the outcome of tire original 
quiet title action that Juan and Yreneflled in CV-07-3536. 
Juan's and Yrene's only interest in the Ranch prior to the entry of the Quiet Title 
Judgment was subject to the claims of Defendant that were alive and well in the original quiet 
title action that Juan and Yrene filed against Defendant. Juan and Yrene had received a default 
quiet title judgment for the property, but that judgment was appealed, and, at the time that Juan 
and Y rene executed the quitclaim deed to Plaintiff, Defendant had a motion to set aside the 
default judgment actually pending before the court in CV-07-3536. Therefore, Juan's and 
Yrene's claims to the Ranch, and consequently, Plaintiffs claims to the Ranch, were always 
subject to the possibility of the district court's original default judgment being set aside, and the 
possibility of reversal of the district court's original decision on appeal. Thus, until the appellate 
court's decision was issued, Plaintiffs interest in the property was always clouded by the 
eventual outcome of the original quiet title action that Plaintiffs predecessors filed, and that was 
pending at the time Plaintiff received the property. 
Plaintiff has attempted to argue that he is a BFP. To satisfy the requirement of a BFP, 
Plaintiff would have had to acquire the property " ... in good faith, and for a valuable 
consideration .... " Plaintiff cannot claim to have purchased the property in good faith because he 
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was fully aware of the then pending litigation, which could have, and eventually did, greatly 
affect his interest in the property. Moreover, Plaintiff did not pay valuable consideration for the 
property. Both Plaintiff and Defendant have testified that the Ranch was worth approximately 
$80,000.00. Plaintiff allegedly only gave $35,000.00 as consideration for the Ranch. The low 
consideration, along with the timing of the quitclaim deed (immediately following the entry of 
Plaintiffs predecessors' default quiet title judgment) all point to a purchase in bad faith, and an 
attempt by Juan, yrene, and Plaintiff to unfairly, and in bad faith, deprive Defendant of his 
interest in the property. 
Even if Plaintiff claims that he knew about the pending lawsuit, but thought that 
judgment was entered in favor of his predecessors at the time he paid for and received the deed 
to the property, Plaintiff cannot claim that he is a BFP without notice of Defendant's claim. 
When it comes to purchasing real property in Idaho, especially where property is conveyed by 
quitclaim deed without the involvement of a title company or title insurance, caveat emptor is the 
prevailing principal for all buyers. 
"[W]hen one is purchasing land, the rule of caveat emptor applies and ... 
'whatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence 
and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a 
reasonable investigation would disclose."' Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 153, 
953 P.2d 588,593 (1998) (quotingHil/v. Fed. Land Bank, 59 Idaho 136,141, 80 
P.2d 789, 791 (1938)). As this Court held in Luce v. Marble: "The general rule is 
that one purchasing property is put on notice as to any claim of title or right of 
possession which a reasonable investigation would reveal." 142 Idaho 264, 271, 
127 P.3d 167, 174 (2005). 
Weitz v. Green, 230 P.3d 743, 750-751 (2010). 
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In this case, Plaintiff knew the litigation was pending. A reasonable individual in 
Plaintiffs shoes would have investigated into whether Juan's and Yrene's case was finished and 
a final determination. A simple visit to Plaintiff's attorney would have revealed that Plaintiffs 
predecessor's interest was far from determined and clouded by the pending motion to set aside 
the default, and later the pending appeal of the district judge's decision. 
2. Plaintiff's predecessor's had the right to appeal or to file a motion to set 
aside the Quiet Title Judgment. Neither Plaintiff nor his predecessors did 
either. 
After Defendant acquired the Quiet Title Judgment, Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's predecessors 
had two options: file a motion to set aside judgment in the CV-07-3536 case or file an appeal in 
said case. See Via/ax Corp. v. Reimar Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 995 P.2d 835; Rule 60(b)(4) 
of I.R.C.P.; and Rule 14(a) of the I.A.R. 
Neither Plaintiff nor his predecessors attempted to set aside the Quiet Title Judgment or 
appeal it within the times allotted under the law. Plaintiff may argue that he did try to set it aside 
by filing the above-entitled action; however, this is not what Plaintiff did. Plaintiff filed a quiet 
title action. Nowhere in Plaintiff's pleadings did Plaintiff allege or plead that Defendant's Quiet 
Title Judgment was void or that it should be set aside. It was not until more than six months after 
the Quiet Title Judgment was entered and nearly two months after Plaintiff had file his quiet title 
action that the issue of a void judgment was even raised. Under Rule 60(b )( 4) Plaintiffs 
predecessors had to file a motion to set aside within a reasonable time. Plaintiff had no more 
rights than his predecessors had. Plaintiff waited for more than six months to do anything about 
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trying to set aside the Quiet Title Judgment as void, and offered no reasonable explanation as to 
the delay in doing so. In Via/ax, Viafax waited for over five months before filing a motion to set 
aside the judgment, and even though the court in that case found that there was a reason to set 
aside the judgment in that case, the court upheld the district court's decision not to set aside the 
judgment because "Viafax ... demonstrated indifference or unreasonable delay in the pursuit of 
this matter." Via/ax, 134 Idaho at 71. In this case, Plaintiff also exhibited unreasonable delay in 
waiting for more than six months to even raise the issue of the Quiet Title Judgment being void. 
C. Defendant's Quiet Title Action was obtained properly and satisfied all 
required due process requirements and is therefore a valid judgment and should be 
in full force and effect. 
To contest the validity of a court's decision based upon lack of service or improper 
service of process, the contesting party must have raised the issue in his first appearance to the 
court, or within one year of the entry of the judgment or order. See Rules 12(6) and 60(6) of the 
I.R.C.P. Juan and Yrene filed the original quiet title action. For them to assert that the court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over them in an action which they filed is absurd. Whether they were 
served with Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim is another matter entirely. 
Plaintiff attempts to argue that the situation in Via/ax is parallel to the situation in this 
case. Via/ax's facts are distinguishable from this case in many respects. First of all, in Via/ax, the 
party that obtained default against Viafax had already filed an answer in the case, and therefore, 
required leave from the court to file amended pleadings; therefore, no pleadings could be filed 
until leave was granted by the court. Via/ax, 134 Idaho at 70. In this case, Defendant had not 
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filed an answer, and therefore, did not require leave of the court to file the Answer and 
Counterclaim. Yes it was filed after a default judgment had been entered, but the Answer and 
Counterclaim was signed by the attorney and signed and verified by Defendant, and a copy was 
served properly upon Juan's and Yrene's then acting attorney as indicated in the certificate of 
service that was attached to the Answer and Counterclaim. Therefore at the earliest, this was 
properly served upon Defendant as of the date of the certificate of service, and at the latest as of 
the date of the order from the Idaho Court of Appeals reversing the district court's decision and 
setting aside Juan's and Irene's default quiet title judgment. As soon as the Court of Appeals 
order came through, the original quiet title case was alive and well with a complaint and 
Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim. Juan's and Yrene's attorney did not move the court to 
withdraw as their attorney until nearly six months after the Court of Appeals entered their 
decision. Between the time of the Court of Appeals' decision and motion to withdraw, the parties 
had participated in at least two status conferences and the parties were moving forward with the 
litigation with the clear understanding of what the pleadings were: the original complaint and 
Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim. Therefore, unlike the Viaf ax case, the Answer and 
Counterclaim was filed and served on Juan and Y rene long before the attorney filed a motion to 
withdraw. Since no new pleadings were presented after the motion to withdraw was granted, 
default was completely appropriate under the circumstances. 
For Plaintiff to now tum around and say that the Answer and Counterclaim was never 
filed and even more that it was never served is frought with issues. If Plaintiff claims to have 
personal knowledge that there was no filing or service of the Answer and Counterclaim, he is 
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now admitting how involved he was with the first litigation, which adds to the evidence that he 
purchased with knowledge of Defendant's interest in the property; thereby, purchasing in bad 
faith. Additionally, how could Plaintiff or Plaintiff's attorney have personal knowledge as to 
what each party to CV-07-3536, had in the case, and whether the judge and the parties to that 
case considered the Answer and Counterclaim served and filed. The only evidence as to what the 
parties and the judge agreed upon regarding the filing and service of Defendant's Answer and 
Counterclaim is the Quiet Title Judgment that was entered, the certificate of service on the 
Answer and Counterclaim, and the testimony of the two attorneys in that action. Obviously, the 
judge would not have granted default on Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim if he believed 
that the Answer and Counterclaim had not been properly filed and served on Plaintiffs. See 
Judgment and Decree Quieting Title, CV-07-3536. 
D. The previous court's Judgment and Decree Quieting Title is res judicata on 
Plaintiff and bars him from obtaining the relief that he is requesting. 
As stated earlier, Plaintiff only has an interest in the Ranch to the extent that the interest 
was released to him by Juan and Yrene by the quitclaim deed. These rights are no more and no 
less than what his predecessors had, with no warranties. Juan's and Yrene's interest in the Ranch 
was adjudicated in the previous quiet title action in CV-07-3635. For this court to say that res 
judicata does not apply in this circumstance is akin to promoting the interpretation of the law 
that individuals that lose their interest in property in a lawsuit may quitclaim their former interest 
to any individual and those claims that had been denied already by the court would now be 
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resurrected by their successor in interest. The result of such a ruling is absurd. That very result is 
the reason that res judicata is a principal in the law. 
By the very nature of the quitclaim deed, a release of claims to another, Plaintiff steps 
directly into the shoes of his predecessors, Juan and Yrene. For all intents of purposes he is now 
them. There could never be a clearer situation where res judicata should apply. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant, Mr. Barraza, respectfully requests that this 
court reconsider its Order Granting Plaintiffs First Motion for Summary Judgment and deny 
said motion; thereby, reinstituting Defendant's Judgment and Decree Quieting Title that was 
entered in CV-07-3536 into full force and effect. 
DATED This __ 1 __ day ofNovember, 2010. 
Attorneys for Bernardino Barraza 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the./!!._ day of November, 2010, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the 
method indicated below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX 829 
BOISE, ID 83701 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas ("W. Cuevas"), by and through 
undersigned counsel, and hereby files this memorandum in opposition to defendants motion to 
reconsider the order granting plaintiff's first motion for swnmary judgment, which order was 
entered on or about November 18, 2009. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
11:!:1 UV,>/ U.l" 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Plaintiff's First Motion for 
Swnmary Judgment ("Motion to Reconsider") is a house of cards. The foundation of that house 
of cards is the quiet title judgment entered in the Case No. CV-2007-3536-C (hereafter, the 
"Underlying Action''), quieting title to the property that is the subject of the above captioned 
matter in favor of defendant, Bernardino Barraza (the "Quiet Title Judgment''). If that Quiet 
Title Judgment is valid, this Court may have reason to consider all of the other arguments set 
forth in defendant's memorandum in support of the motion for reconsideration. However, if that 
quiet title judgment is void- as this Court ordered when it granted plaintiff"s first motion for 
summary judgment on November 19, 2009-then the house of cards collapses and the entirety of 
defendant's Motion to Reconsider is without merit and need not be considered by this Court. Af> 
the following demonstrates, not only is the Quiet Title Judgment entered in the Underlying 
Action void, defendant's other arguments in support of the Motion to Reconsider are without 
merit and do not provide a basis for reconsidering and/or reversing the prior order. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Underlying Quiet Title Judgment is Void. 
The facts surrounding the entry of the Quiet Title Judgment are not in dispute. 
Both parties agree that the only "service" and "filing" of the answer and counterclaim that 
support the Quiet Title Judgment came in the form of an attachment to the affidavit of counsel in 
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support of defendant's motion to set aside default in the Underlying Action. The only remaining 
issue - a pure question of law - is whether attaching a proposed answer and counterclaim to an 
affidavit of counsel in support of a motion to set aside default is legally sufficient to satisfy the 
filing and service requirements set forth under Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals expressly held in Via/ax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 
Idaho 65, 995 P.2d 835 (Ct. App. 2000) that attaching a proposed answer and counterclaim to an 
affidavit in support of a motion does not constitute either effective filing or service of the same: 
Service of a motion for leave to file a counterclaim, even with the 
proposed counterclaim attached, is not the equivalent of 
service of the counterclaim itself. As Viafax argues, receipt of 
the motion gave it notice only that it could object to a counterclaim 
being filed and that the motion might be granted. It remained 
possible that the court would deny the motion, even without an 
objection from Viafax, or that Stuckenbrock would abandon the 
effort. Filing and service of the counterclaim itself could be 
properly accomplished only after permission had been 
obtained from the Court. See I.RC.P. 13(e); 15(d). Such service 
was never performed. 
Id. at 70, 995 P.2d at 840. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish Viafax on the grounds that in Viafax, a motion 
for leave to file a counterclaim was at issue whereas, in the present matter, a motion to set aside 
the default was at issue. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order Granting 
Plaintiff's First Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider') at 9-10. The argument presented by Defendant is that in Viafax, the defendant 
required leave of court to file the counterclaim, whereas in the underlying action no answer had 
been filed, thereby giving defendant the opportunity to file an answer and counterclaim as a 
matter of right. Defendant's attempt to distinguish Via/ax on this ground is without merit. 
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While it is true that no answer had been filed in the underlying action, default had 
been entered against Defendant in that action. Accordingly, in order to have the right to file an 
answer, Defendant needed to first' have the default set aside. That did not even arguably occur 
until the Court of Appeals entered its order directing that the default was set aside which 
occurred on June 25, 2008, over one year after the affidavit containing the proposed answer and 
counterclaim had been filed. Significantly, as the register of actions shows, there was no 
., 
substantive activity between the dates of June 25, 2008, when the Court of Appeals' Order was 
entered, and December 12, 2008, when the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying a 
petition for review of the Court of Appeals' Order. See Memorandwn in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Swnmary Judgment, filed September 21, 2009 (''Memorandwn in Support of First 
MST') at Appendix A. The only activity shown in the register of action during that time frame 
were status conferences; no substantive pleadings were filed. After the Supreme Court entered 
the order denying the motion for review on December 12, 2008, the only substantive action in 
the case was the unopposed motion for leave to withdraw as attorney ofrecord, filed by 
Juan Cuevas's counsel only five days after entry of the order denying the petition for review. Id. 
Defendant's representation in the Memorandwn in Support of the Motion for 
Reconsideration that "the parties were moving forward with the litigation with the clear 
understanding of what the pleadings were" is disingenuous at best. Though six months elapsed 
between entry of the Court of Appeals' Order reversing the district court (June 25, 2008) and 
counsel's motion for leave to withdraw (December 17, 2008), (i) the answer and counterclaim 
had not been tiled or served and (ii) the counterclaim had not been answered. If the parties and 
the Court were operating, during that six month timeframe, as though the answer and 
counterclaim had been properly filed and served, when was the answer to the counterclaim due? 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER GRANTING 
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And why did Barraza not provide a three day notice of intent to take default when the due date 
passed with no substantive response to the counterclaim? ffBarraza's claim that the parties and 
the Court secretly believed, agreed, and were proceeding as though the answer and counterclaim 
had been "deemed" filed and served as of the entry of the Court of Appeals order reversing the 
District Court's denial of the motion to set aside default entered against Barraza are correct, then 
why did Barraza not take action to force Juan Cuevas to answer the counterclaim or otherwise 
move for default while Juan Cuevas was still represented by an attorney? The simple answer is 
that there was a petition for review pending before the Supreme Court and within one week after 
that petition was denied, Juan Cuevas' s counsel filed the motion to withdraw as the attorney of 
record for Juan Cuevas. 
The Idaho Supreme Court made it clear in Via/ax that attaching a proposed 
answer to a motion is insufficient and does not constitute service: "Service of a motion for leave 
to file a counterclaim, even with the proposed counterclaim attached, is not the equivalent of 
service of the counterclaim itself." Viafax, 134 Idaho at 70, 995 P.2d 835. Defendant has not 
identified any factual or legal basis to distinguish the present matter from the Via/ax decision: 
"in our view the district court erred in concluding that service of this motion alone was sufficient 
to put Viafax at risk of a default judgment." Id. Accordingly, Defendant has not presented any 
basis for this Court to reconsider its order holding that the Quiet Title Judgment entered in the 
Underlying Action was void, and such order should be affirmed. 
B. No Basis Exists to Reverse the Prior Order Denying Barraza's Motion to 
Strike. 
Not only was this Court's prior order denying Barraza's motion to strike the 
Affidavit ofWilfrido Cuevas in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Cuevas 
Affidavit") was correct, the information contained in the Cuevas Affidavit was not necessary for 
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this Court to reach its decision granting plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment1 and, 
therefore, even if the decision was incorrect, it was not hannful error. 
~ UU7 /Ul2 
The contents of the Cuevas Affidavit show that W. Cuevas had an interest in the 
Property prior to the commencement of the Underlying Action. These facts are only of 
consequence, insofar as the motions for summary judgment are concerned, for purposes of 
establishing that the Quiet Title Judgment was not res judicata as to W. Cuevas. However, 
because this Court determined that the Quiet Title Judgment was void, such judgment could not 
have a preclusive effect in any event and this Court did not need to consider whether the 
judgment would have had a preclusive effect against W. Cuevas, had such judgment not been 
declared void. 
Even if it was necessary for this Court to rely upon the Cuevas Affidavit in 
reaching either of its decisions granting summary judgment in favor ofW. Cuevas, such affidavit 
is admissible and was properly before this Court. As discussed in Plaintiff's Opposition to 
Defendant Barraza's Objection and Motion to Strike, in this matter the property was transferred 
by written instrument: i.e., the Quitclaim Deed from Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez to Wilfrido 
Cuevas. The statute of frauds does not exclude prior consistent testimony that explains the 
circumstances underlying a transfer of an interest in property. Because the Property was 
ultimately transfer via written instrument, the statute of frauds has no application in this matter 
and does not bar the testimony set forth in the Cuevas Affidavit. 
1 The information contained in the Cuevas Affidavit was also not essential to this Court's 
order granting the second motion for summary judgment. It is the understanding of Counsel that 
the second motion for summary judgment was granted because (i) defendant could not establish 
that he had any colorable claim to the Property, as all of the contracts upon which defendant 
relied were unenforceable pursuant to the statute of frauds and (ii) plaintiff had a valid, duly 
executed and recorded deed establishing his right to the property. Neither of these findings 
required this Court to consider the information contained in the Cuevas Affidavit. 
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C. W. Cuevas was not Required to Appeal or File a Motion to Set Aside in the 
Underlying Matter. 
Barraza makes much of the fact that no appeal and no motion to set aside were 
filed in the underlying matter. While it might have been possible to address the improper 
judgment entered in the underlying matter through those procedural mechanisms, W. Cuevas 
(who was not a party in the Underlying Action) was not required to do so and was not limited by 
those two options. 
Plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment attacked the Quiet Title Judgment 
on the grounds that it was void and of no force and effect. It is well settled that "A judgment of 
a court without jurisdiction is void, and void judgments may be attacked at any time .... " Burns 
v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003) (citing Burnham v. Superior Court of 
Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990)). "A void judgment ... may be entirely disregarded or declared 
inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it .... It may be attacked by 
a person adversely affected by it, in any proceeding, direct or collateral, and at any time." 
Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274,281,340 P.2d 848,852 (1959) (quoting 30A AM. JUR. Judgments 
§ 45). Because the underlying Quite Title Judgment was void, it was not necessary for 
W. Cuevas to move to set that judgment aside in a case where he was not even a party. 
Because the underlying Quiet Title Judgment was void, and a void judgment may 
be collaterally attacked at any time, this Court need not consider defendant's arguments that 
W. Cuevas should have exercised different procedural remedies or exercised more diligence in 
seeking the relief granted pursuant to Plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment. 
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D. Defendant's Reliance on Rules 12(b) and 60(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure is Misplaced. 
14] 009/012 
Defendant cites rules 12(b) and 60(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and 
then fails to discuss why or how those rules apply to either the facts of the present matter and/or 
the underlying matter in which the Quiet Title Judgment was entered. Looking at the plain 
language of each of these rules, however, it is clear that neither applies in this case. 
Rule 12(b) provides that defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter 
(12(b)(l), lack of jurisdiction over the person (12(b)(2)), and/or insufficiency of service of 
process (12(b)(5)) must be raised by motion before any responsive pleading was filed. 
Juan Cuevas did not waive these defenses because no responsive pleading was ever filed by 
Juan Cuevas; and the reason no responsive pleading was ever filed is because the answer and the 
counterclaim was not filed with the Court and was not served on Juan Cuevas or his attorney. 
Because the answer and counterclaim were never filed and served, the deadline for filing a 
responsive pleading was never triggered; a responsive pleading was never filed; and these 
defenses could not, therefore, have been waived. Rather, the Court in the underlying proceeding 
improperly granted default on a counterclaim that had not been filed and served. 
Contrary to defendant's claims on page 10-11 of the Memorandum in Support of 
the Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff's current position that the answer and counterclaim 
were never filed is not an admission that he was involved in the prior action. Rather, those facts 
are a matter of public record and are facts which plaintiff requested this Court take judicial notice 
of, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 20l(d). Plaintiffs request that this Court take judicial 
notice of the record in the underlying action does not constitute an admission that plaintiff was 
involved in the prior action. Likewise, defendant's current contention that "the judge and the 
parties to [the underlying action] considered the Answer and Counterclaim served and filed" is 
OPPOSffiON TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER GRANTING 
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not only unsupported by the record, it is legally irrelevant. Parties cannot, by secret agreement, 
··deem" or "consider" something to have been filed and become a part of the Court's record. 
Had there been some substantive litigation that transpired that was directly referable to the 
proposed answer and counterclaim attached to the affidavit ofcounsel (i.e., had Juan Cuevas 
answered the counterclaim or issued discovery based on allegations set forth in either the answer 
or counterclaim), there might be some modicum of support for plaintiffs contention that the 
parties and the court "considered" the answer and counterclaim to have been filed. However, 
when the only actions ofrecord are (i) the Supreme Court's denial of Juan Cuevas's petition for 
review, and (ii) Juan Cuevas's attorney's motion for leave to withdraw as counsel, there is 
simply no indication in the record of that separate case that the parties "considered" the answer 
and counterclaim filed. 
Banaza's argument that the Court must have deemed the counterclaim to have 
been served and filed because it entered default judgment based on the same is a logical fallacy 
based on circular reasoning. The question presented is whether the Court erred in entering 
default judgment quieting title when the answer and counterclaim were not properly filed and 
served. The answer to that question cannot be that the Court cannot err, so the answer and 
counterclaim must have been properly filed and served. We cannot look to the result as proof 
that the process was correct; were that the case, the concept of a void judgment (i.e., a judgment 
entered without jurisdiction and authority), would not and could not exist. 
Defendant's reliance on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is equally misplaced. 
First, the rule, by its express terms, applies to "a party or his legal representative." It is 
undisputed that W. Cuevas was not a party in the Underlying Action. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, a void judgment may be collaterally attacked at any time. W. Cuevas did not need to rely 
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on the procedural mechanisms set forth in Rule 60(b) in order to collaterally attack the void 
judgment. 
E. Res Judicata Does Not Bar the Present Action. 
As discussed at length above, the Quiet Title Judgment is void and a void 
judgment has no force and effect at all. It canriot, therefore, have the preclusive effect of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel. 
Even if the Quiet Title Judgment was not void, the judgment would not have a 
preclusive effect for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, filed on September 21, 2009, at 13-17, and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
ID. CONCLUSION 
L!!,JU..L .. IJU..L..:; 
For the foregoing reasons, W. Cuevas respectfully requests that this Court enter 
an order denying defendant's motion for reconsideration in its entirety and enter a final judgment 
in this matter. 
DATED this 24th day of November, 2010. 
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By 7?:::--e-
Rebecca A. Rainey- Of the p· 
Attorneys for Plaintiff1Counte11 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of November, 2010, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing OPPOSfflON TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Ba"aza 
o,.._U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
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HALL, FlURDL Y & WARD 
Attorney.~ /hr Defendant Bernardino fJarrnw 
340 F.alit 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587·3144 
fdaho State Bur Number 4442 
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DEC O 1 2010 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
B RAYNE:, DEPUTY 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDlClAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF' CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DERNARDINO DARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES l 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIRED 
fN EXJJJBTT ''A", COMMONLY KNOWN 1 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, : 
I 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV09-8 I 75 
REPLY TO PLAlNTfff'S 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
RRCONSIDRR ORDER 
GRANTfNQ PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW RRRNARDTNO RARRAZA, Defondunt herein, by and through hi~ 
attorney of record, Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and submits the 
following reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion tu Reconsider Order Granting 
Plaintiff's First Motion fbr Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff aUcgcs in his Opposition to Motion to Reconsider that 
"The Idaho Court of Appeals expressly held in Viqfax Corp v, Stuckcmbrosk, 
134 Idaho 65, 995 P.2d 835 (CL App. 2000) that attaching a proposed 
answer and counterclaim to an affidavit in support of a motion docs not 
constitute either effective filing or service of the same." 
RliPLY TO PLAINTil:''J-1 'S Ol'l'OSITION TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER GRANTlN(l 1'1./\INl'IH'S 
FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMAR V JUl)(JMENT - I 
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This is not true. The Court in Viqfax never hdd that atlm.:hing a. prnrosed answer and 
counterclaim lo an affidavit in supporl of a molion does not constitute either elli::ctive 
filing or service. The Court in Vi~/'ax held that the default judgment stands because 110 
timely motion to set aside judgrrnmt nor an appeal was filed. 
Theri:forc, although Viafax has shown that the defaulljudgment was 
acquired through impermh,sihlc surpris~, we uphold Lhc districl court's 
denial of Via.fax's motion to set aside the default judgment on the ground 
that the motion was not brought within a reasonable time. ld at 71 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, prior default judgment was 
void becau.qc it was not filed or served. The Court in Viq/i:ix never held the judgment was 
void but insti-:ad upheld the judgment and further held thal it was valid because n<> appeal 
or motion to set aside was timely filed. 
The Cour'l in Viq/ax slated in dicta that ff Plaintiff wouhl have filed promptly, the 
court could have granted a motion to seL aside judgment for lack of service ofnt!w claims 
after the wilh<lrawal of atto~ey. The counterclaim had newr been served UJl<rn Viafa.'\. 
In short, Viajw: was never served with a pleading that it was obliged to 
answer in order to avoid the risk of a default judgment. Enlry of the derault 
judgmenl was therefore a "surprise" for which relief is authorized by Rule 
60(b)( /). Id at 70 
The court never held attaching is not filing. In fact, even in Vit!fax the ldaho Court 
of Appeals never disturbed the District Court's holding that the counterclaim attached to 
the M(>tion for Leave was filed, however the court indicated that the filing was not 
effective until June 6, 1997, the date of tht Order Granting Motion for Leave to File. 
Rl\l'I.Y TO l'L/\INTIFl-'S OPJ>OSITION TO MOTION TO RliCONSIUl:iR ORDER GRANTING Pl .AINTIFr"S 
FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMARY Jl.J()(iMENT. 2 
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Sent By: HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD; 208 587 3144; 17:45; . 
DATED this--\- day ofDt::cemher, 2010. 
REPLY TO PLAINTWF'"S orrOSlTION TO MO HON TO RJ:::CONSIDliR ORDER GRANTING l'LAINUrf'S 
FlRST MOTION t'OR SUMMARY HJOC'iMENT - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVTCF 
THEREBY CERTIFY that upon lh~ _/_ day of December, 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of Reply to PlainLiff's Opposition to Motion to Reconsider 
Order Granting Plaintirrs First Motion for Summary Judgment by the method indicated 
below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY 
MOPPATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTO. 
P.O. BOX829 
BOJSEi In 83701 
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BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual ) 
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, ) 
an individual and spouse (if any); DOES I ) 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS ) 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED ) 
IN EXHIBIT "A," COMMONLY KNOWN ) 





BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual ) 






WILFRIDO CUEVAS, ) 
) 
Counter defendant. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2009-8175 
ORDER ON SUPPLEMENT AL 
ARGUMENT RE SUMMARY 
WDGMENT AND MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Appearances: Rebecca Rainey for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant 
Robert Ward for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
RE SUMMARY WDGMENT AND MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 
000503 
This matter comes before this Court on the issue of Defendant Barraza' s 
supplemental argument in opposition to the plaintiff's second motion for summary 
judgment as well as Defendant Barraza's Motion to Reconsider the Order Granting 
Plaintiffs (first) Motion for Summary Judgment. 
At the October 14, 2010 hearing on the plaintiffs second motion for summary 
judgment, the Court tentatively granted the motion, but stated it would wait to sign the 
order for thirty days, to give defense counsel an opportunity to file a motion to 
reconsider. Thereafter defense counsel filed both a supplemental brief in opposition to 
the second motion for summary judgment, as well as a motion to reconsider the Order 
Granting Plaintiffs (first) Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral argument on the motion 
to reconsider was heard on December 2, 2010. 
"The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 
914 (2001 ). After careful consideration of the presentations of the parties, as well as the 
record in its entirety, the Court finds that the determinations previously made with respect 
to both the first and second motions for summary judgment are correct under the 
circumstances of this case. Therefore, the tentative ruling of the Court granting 
plaintiffs second motion for summary judgment is hereby made final. For the reasons 
set forth in court on November 3, 2009, the hearing on the plaintiffs first motion for 
summary judgment, January 8, 2010, the hearing on defendant's previous Motion to 
Reconsider and/or Clarify, October 14, 2010, and December 2, 2010, the present Motion 
to Reconsider is DENIED. 
ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 2 
000504 
The hearing currently set on December 20, 2010, for ruling on this matter is 
VACATED. 
DATEDthisll___dayof L,2010. 
ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
RE SUMMARY WDGMENT AND MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 3 
000S05 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was 
forwarded to the following persons on this __ day of ____ _, 2010: 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY, & WARD 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Rebecca Rainey 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD, 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
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BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual ) 
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, ) 
an individual and spouse (if any); DOES I ) 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS ) 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED ) 
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BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual ) 
CASE NO. CV-2009-8175 
ORDER ON SUPPLEMENT AL 
ARGUMENT RE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
and spouse (if any), qooso8 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS 
zg452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 





Case No. CV09-8 l 73 
ORDER GRANTING WILFRIDO 
CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On August 31, 2010, plaintiff/counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas ("Cuevas") filed 
his Second Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the following relief: 
(i) Quieting title to the Property in the name of Wilfrido Cuevas free and 
clear of any interest claimed by defendant/counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza ("Barraza"); and 
ORDER GRANTING WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
000509 
Client:1808473.1 
(ii) Ordering that Barraza take nothing by his claims against Cuevas for unjust 
enrichment. 
The motion was fully briefed and addressed by the parties and the matter was 
heard before this Court on October 14, 2010. Rebecca A Rainey of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, 
Rock & Fields, Chartered, appeared for Cuevas; Robert Ward of Hall, Friedly & Ward appeared 
for Barraza. The Court, having made findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record, and 
good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
is hereby GRANTED in its entire~ n /) / 
DATED thisµ day of ~010. 
ORDER GRANTING WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi~s; day of ~ , 2010, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing O ER GRANrtNGWILFRIDO CUEVAS' 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
~-Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Clerk ( 
ORDER GRANTING WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION 
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BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any); LIO BALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS 
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 





Case No. CV09-8175 
JUDGMENT 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Wilfrido Cuevas' ("Cuevas") 
Complaint to Quiet Title, filed on August 7, 2009, the Answer of Bernardino Barraza filed on or 
about August 27, 2009, and the Amended Answer and Counterclaim Filed by Defendant 
Bernardino Barraza on or about December 15, 2009, and the matters set forth therein being 
disposed of by the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment entered 
November 10, 2009, and the Order Granting Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
JUDGMENT-I Client: 1808598.1 
00051.2 
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entered [) {:!. C I ~ , and order entering default ttft@ elufaalt j adgtnent against 
llf~in-;.J i ft 7. u I u 
defendant Liobaldo Garza entered on ~-tl"-- , the Court finds that plaintiff Cuevas 
is entitled to judgment against defendants, and each of them, as prayed for in the Complaint to 
Quiet Title. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED that plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas have and hereby is awarded default judgment against 
Liobaldo Garza and is awarded judgment against Bernardino Barraza, DOES I through X, 
inclusive, together with their respective heirs, assigns, and successors in interest, and all other 
persons or entities unknown claiming any right, title or interest in the following described real 
property located at A PART OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF THE SOUTHEAST 
QUARTER, SECTION 19, TOWNSHIP 6 NORTH, RANGE 5 WEST, BOISE MERIDIAN, 
CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED TO-WIT: 
COMMENCJNG AT THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF 
THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER, SECTION 19, TOWNSHIP 6 NORTH, RANGE 5 WEST, 
BOISE MERIDIAN; THE INITIAL POINT OF THIS DESCRIPTION; THENCE NORTH 
0°07' EAST 924 FEET, ALONG THE WEST LINE OF THE SAID SOUTHWEST QUARTER 
OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER; THENCE SOUTH 55°15' EAST 336.82 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 0°07' WEST 730 FEET, PARALLEL TO THE SAID WEST LINE, TO A POJNT ON 
THE SOUTH LINE OF THE SAID SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF THE SOUTHEAST 
QUARTER; THENCE SOUTH 89°35' WEST 277.15 FEET, ALONG THE SAID SOUTH 
LINE TO THE INITIAL POINT OF THIS DESCRIPTION, more commonly known as 29452 
Pearl Road, Parma, Idaho (hereafter the "Property"), as follows: 
JUDGMENT-2 Client 1808598.1 
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1. Plaintiff owns in fee simple and is entitled to the quiet and peaceful 
possession of all the right, title, and interest in and to the Property; 
2. That any right, title, estate, interest or lien of defendants, and each of 
them, and all persons claiming under or through them, in the Property is hereby divested, 
annulled, and canceled regardless of whether such right, title, and interest are represented by a 
verbal commitment or representation, by a document, by a recorded document, or by any other 
means of any kind or nature, whether in law or in equity; 
3. That defendant Bernardino Barraza take nothing by his counterclaim; and 
4. That plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to serve his petition for 
costs, as a matter of right, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l), which is subject to 
objection by defendant Bernardino Barraza and approval by this Court. 
This Judgment shall be considered to be a final judgment and is intended to 
constitute the final judgment in this matter. 
DATED thi~ ~day of_1-=-....,,...=-..,;ri 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 222..._ day of b,g ~"', 2010, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Robert Ward 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile (208) 587-3144 
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza 
JUDGMENT-4 
µD.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(4U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Cle~ 
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Client: 1808598. 1 
ROBERT WARD 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
_F __ , A.k ,:B 
JAN 2 7 2011 
D 
P.M. 
Attorneys for Appellant Bernardino Barraza 
340 East 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Email: Robert@hfwlaw.com 
Idaho State Bar Number 4442 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO;, IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual 
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, an 
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I 
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED 
IN EXHIBIT"A", COMMONLY KNOWN. 
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO, 
Defendants/ AJ?Eellant. 
Case No. CV09-8175 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVENAMED RESPONDENT, Wilfrido Cuevas, AND THE RESPONDENT'S 
AT]'ORNEY, Rebecca A Rainey, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock &Fields, Chartered; 101 S. 
Capi!oIBlv4., 10th F}oor,P.0. Box 829, Boise, ID 83701-0829, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE. 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Bernardino Barraza, appeals against the above-
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered in the above-
entitled action on the 23rd day of December, 2010, Honorable Gregory M. Culet presiding. 
2. That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 
11 (a)(l) I.A.R. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 
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3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then intends 
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal. 
a. The district court erred in granting Plaintiffs first Motion for Summary 
Judgment in holding that the prior Judgment and Decree Quieting Title it 
entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 on March 17, 2009, was void and ofno 
force and effect. 
b. The district court erred in granting Plaintiffs first Motion for Summary 
Judgment in holding that the prior Judgment and Decree Quieting Title it 
entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 on March 17, 2009, does not operate as 
res judicata and does not have a preclusive effect so as to bar the claims 
for relief set forth in the above-captioned matter. 
c. The district court erred in not granting Defendant's Objection and Motion 
to Strike any reference by Plaintiff to an alleged oral contract to purchase 
real property that was filed on October 21, 2009. 
d. The district court erred in not granting Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Clarify Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
that was filed on November 20, 2009. 
e. The district court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
Order Granting Plaintiffs First Motion for Summary Judgment that was 
filed on November 12, 2010. 
f. The district court erred in granting Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment by quieting title to the property in the name of Plaintiff, 
Wilfrido Cuevas, free and clear of any interest claimed by Defendant, 
Bernardino Barraza. 
g. The district court erred in divesting Defendant of his right, title, and 
interest in the property. 
h. The district court erred in granting Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment in holding that Defendant takes nothing by his counterclaim. 
1. The district court erred in not granting Defendant's Objection and Motion 
to Strike that was filed on September 16, 2010. 
J. The district court erred in holding that Defendant's written contract to 
purchase the real property did not satisfy the statute of frauds. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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5. No transcript is necessary since this case was decided in its entirety on summary 
judgment. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR. 
a. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed on September 22, 2009 
b. Affidavit of Rebecca A. Rainey in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on September 21, 2009 
c. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on September 21, 2009 
d. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed on September 21, 2009 
e. Defendant's Objection and Motion to Strike filed on October 21, 2009 
f. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza filed on October 21, 2009 
g. Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on October 21, 2009 
h. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on October 27, 2009 
i. Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant Bernardino Barraza's Objection and 
Motion to Strike filed on October 27, 2009 
J. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 
November 10, 2009 
k. Motion to Reconsider and/or Clarify Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on November 20, 2009 
1. Cuevas' Memorandum in Opposition to Barraza's Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Clarify Order filed on January 21, 2010 
m. Court Minute filed on January 2 8, 2010 
n. Wilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 
31,2010 
o. Memorandum in Support ofWilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on August 31, 2010 
NOTICE OF APPEAL ~ 3 
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p. Affidavit of Rebecca Rainey in Support ofWilfiido Cuevas' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 31, 2010 
q. Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on September 15, 2010 
r. Affidavit of Robert Ward in Support of Answering Brief in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed on September 15, 
2010 
s. Objection and Motion to Strike filed on September 16, 2010 
t. Reply Memorandwn in Support ofWilfiido Cuevas' Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on September 23, 2010 
u. Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant Barraza's Objection and Motion to 
Strike filed on September 23, 2010 
v. Supplemental Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on November 3, 2010 
w. Plaintiffs Response to Supplemental Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed on November 9, 2010 
x. Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Plaintiffs First Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on November 12, 2010 
y. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order Granting 
Plaintiffs First Motion for Summary Judgment filed on November 12, 
2010 
z. Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Plaintiffs First 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on November 24, 2010 
aa. Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Order Granting 
Plaintiffs First Motion for Summary Judgment filed on December 1, 2010 
bb. Order on Supplemental Argument RE: Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Reconsideration filed on December 15, 2010 
cc. Order Granting Wilfiido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed on December 16, 2010 
dd. Judgment filed on December 23, 2010 
7. Civil cases only. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or 
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme 
Court: None. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set 
out below: None. 
b. That the clerk of the district court has not been paid an estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript since no transcript is requested. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That all appellate filing fees have been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED THIS Q.-lo day of January, 2011. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the~ day of January, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of Notice of Appeal by the method indicated below, addressed to the following: 
REBECCA A. RAINEY /u.s. Mail 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHTD. 
P.O. BOX 829 
BOISE, ID 83701 
FAX: (208) 385-5384 







Rebecca A ·Rainey, ISB No. 7525 
REBECCA A. RAINEY, P .A 
2627 W. Idaho Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone (208) 559-6434 
Facsimile (208) 473-2952 
rar@rebeccaraineylaw.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
7";1d_ L E D 
---...........,"'-'A.M_. ---1P.M. 
FEB 1 a 20ft 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEfDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
Case No. CV 09-8175 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPTS 
vs. 
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, et 
al. 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
TO: THE ABOVE NA.\1ED APPELLANT, Bernadino Barraza, AND THE PARTY'S 
ATTORNEY, Robert Ward, Hall, Friedly & Ward, AND THE CLERK AND 
REPORTERS OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding 
hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.AR., the inclusion of the following material in the 
reporter's transcript or the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the 
I.AR. and the notice of appeal. 
Respondent requests that additional transcripts be provided in 
[ ] hard copy 
[ ] electronic format 
[X] both: 
1. November 3, 2009 (9:00 AM) Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Reporter: Kim Saunders. 
2. January 28, 2010 ( 11 :00 AM) Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and 
Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer/Counterclaim. Reporter: Laura Whiting. 
000522 
3. October 14, 2010 ( 1: 3 0 PM) Hearing on Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Reporter: Laura Whiting. 
4. December 2, 2010 (9:00 AM) Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. 
Reporter: Laura Whiting; 
5. I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the reporters of the district 
court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
Dated this q #.-day of February, 2011. 
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REBECCA A. RATNEY, P.A. 
By 72--e_ 
Rebecca A. Rainey - Of the Fi 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Responden 
. I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~y of February, 2011, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPTS to be served. by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Robert Ward 
HALL,,FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 E. 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
William Hurst 
Clerk of District Court 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Facsimile: (208) 454-7525 
Kim Saunders 
Court Reporter to Hon. Judge Culet 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Facsimile: (208) 454-7525 
Laura Whiting 
Court Reporter to Hon. Judge Culet 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Facsimile: (208) 454-7525 
M_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
!)4U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
r:Jt I 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 


























Case No. CV-09-08175*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
is being sent as an exhibit: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 4 day of A Dt ,' ( , 2011. 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
m the County of Canyon. 
By: ,-§~~-~~- Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 


























Case No. CV-09-08175*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including documents requested. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ,, 1 day of /4(Jt: i ( , 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and County of Canyon. 
By: L~~~- Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 


























Supreme Court No. 38493 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each 
party as follows: 
Robert Ward, HALL FRIEDLY & WARD, 340 East 2nd North St., 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Rebecca A. Rainey, 2627 West Idaho St., Boise, Idaho 83702 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _,+---J __ day of __ A.....,.t ...... "'~'-' -~ 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
m the County of Canyon. 
By: ir~-~:;{A,JL-"'~- Deputy 
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